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SCOPE
A brief history of labor relations in the United
States. An analysis and interpretation of Execu-
tive Order No. IO988 emphasizing those controver-
sial matters which have arisen such as: unit de-
terminations, voting, appeal, recognition of em-
ployee organizations and the relation between the
National Labor Relations Board decisions and the
interpretation of the Order. Consideration being
given to arbitration decisions, the N.L.R.A.,
the N.L.R.B. and Federal decision. An analysis
of what some of the initial contracts between
labor and Armed Forces management have entailed
and recommended procedures to be followed by
members of Armed Forces management with labor
when negotiating.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1962, President Kennedy issued Execu-
tive Order IO988 on Employee-Management Cooperation in
the Federal Service. This order represents a milestone
in establishing the rights of government workers to
2
organize without reprisal, to obtain various forms of
3recognition-^ for their unions, to engage in collective
k Kbargaining, and to negotiate signed agreements. For
the first time unions are in a position of having, as a
matter of law, the right to bargain with management con-
cerning their problems and to take part in formulating
and implementing federal personnel policies and practices,
Executive Order IO988 will probably prove to be
one of the most significant changes encountered in per-
sonnel management in the Federal Government during this
era. A union that is exclusively recognized will repre-
sent all members in the unit, including those not mem-
bers of the union or, for that matter, any labor Organi-
ze
zation. Sources outside the government, arbitrators,
_
1. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962)
/hereinafter cited as 10988/-
2. 10988 § la.
3. 10988 §§ 3-6.
k. 10988 § 6a.
5. 10988 § 7.
6. 10988 § 6b.

will make advisory arbitration decisions on election
7and unit designation controversies. The government
employer will find himself sitting down at the bar-
gaining table and listening to his labor counterpart.
The press has hailed it as a framework for a better
civil service in the interest of all the citizens of
Q
the United States. Unions initially praised it, com-
9paring it with the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912,' but
have later criticized it for its lack of enforcement ma-
chinery and the finality of decision making by the
*
10government
.
Of all the branches of the government, the one
which has had the hardest time adjusting to the order
and to whose nature ±~c is most in conflict is the Depart-
ment of Defense. The soldier is taught to reach quick,
decisive decisions with immediate execution of those de-
cisions once they are made. The concept of bargaining
with subordinates is against the soldier's very nature.
This, of course, is almost an opposite philosophy from
collective bargaining. This difference should be kept
7. 10988 § 11.
8. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20 , 1962, p. 20.
9. AFL-CIO News, Jan. 20, 1962, p. 6.
10. Address by A. B. Gretta, Pres. AFL-CIO (1963),
to Office of Industrial Relations, Dep l t of Navy,
Washington, D. C, Government Employee Relations Reps.
k. E(l) 1963 published by Bureau of Nat » 1 Affairs
/hereinafter cited as GERR./.

in mind as it is bound to affect the implementation of
the order until such time as the implications of 10988
have had time to "become realized and accepted. Because
of modern technology, the military commander often
finds himself in the position of an industrial manager,
and he must then think as a manager to adequately per-
form his duties. The management-labor relationship is
just one more phase of the military industrial complex.
There is nothing to indicate unions are not here to
stay. In fact, unions have had defense employees as
members for years, but they have been dealt with by the
government on an informal basis. Now they must be dealt
with on a formal basis. The realization that labor
unions are now a formal part of government-employee
relationships must be met.
To properly deal with the problems generated by
IO988, we necessarily must understand the order itself
and its related regulations. Of particular importance
is ah understanding of some of the background; the pro-
tection of employees who join unions; types of recogni-
tion; to whom recognition is granted; the grievance and
appellate process; and the permitted contents of the
agreement itself arrived at by collective bargaining.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF LABOR RELATIONS
A. Development of National Labor Policy
Since the beginning there have been labor problems,
and nations as well as societies have been influenced,
and. even destroyed as a result. So long as one man works
for another there will be management-labor problems.
From the time of the Greeks and Romans history has seen
the fight between management and labor transform the
lives of the world 1 s inhabitants as a result of the transi'
tion from slavery to serfdom to the industrial revolu-
tion. Entire concepts of political philosophy have de-
veloped, such as communism and capitalism. Certainly
labor problems are not new.
Prior to 1930 the lav/ of labor relations was pri-
marily formulated by court decisions from the common
law. As labor relations became more complex, it became
apparent that legislation was necessary to cope with in-
creasing problems.
11
In 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a statute whose
main purpose was to prevent federal courts from using
injunctions in labor disputes, was passed. Prior to
11. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C
i§ 101-115 (1932).

th.is time it had been customary for employers to get
injunctions to prohibit employees from striking and
taking other types of labor action.
In 1935 j the Wagner, or National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), was passed. This is considered to be the
basic labor legislation in this country today along -with
13the Railway Labor Act. -^ In essence, both acts ensure
the employee and his union the right of collective bar-
gaining with the employer. The NLRA makes it an unfair
labor practice not to bargain with employees. In 1947,
the NLRA was amended by what is commonly known as the
14Taft-Hartley Act, and again in 1959 *>y the Labor Man-
1
5
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) . The
Taft-Hartley Act attempts to put unions on the same
footing with management as far as undesirable labor
practices are concerned. The LMRDA was a corrective
type act, inasmuch as it reaffirmed the policies of the
12. National Labor Relations Act, 47 Stat. 449,
29 U^S.C. SS 151-168 (1935) /hereinafter cited as
NLRA/.
13. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, ^5 U.S.C.
§§ 151-163, 181-188 (1926).
14. Labor Management Relations Act, 47 Stat. 440,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1947) /hereinafter cited as
LMRAJ.
15. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959) /hereinafter
cited as LMRDA/.

previous legislation and attempted to prevent improper
practices on the part of labor, management, union
organizations, and various labor consultants. The over-
all Federal policy can be summarized as encompassing
(l) industrial peace entailing continued production un-
interrupted by strikes and lockouts, (2) collective bar-
gaining to forestall disputes between government and
labor, (3) the right of employees to be free from inter-
ference in forming their labor organizations and to be
free from unethical practices and coercion of unions,
(h) the discouragement and discontinuance of secondary
strikes and boycotts, jurisdictional disputes and feather-
bedding based on the theory that the economic conse-
quences are undesirable, and (5) short of compulsory
arbitration, every action must be taken to prevent and
postpone strikes which impair the health and welfare of
16
the nation. The basis for the above federal legisla-
tion is afforded by the commerce clause of the Consti-
tutxon.
For a quarter of a century since the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 s it has, in
16. CCH, 1964 Guidebook to Labor Relations, para.
203.6.
17. U. S. Const, art. 1, § 8.

Tact, been the policy of the U. S. Government to encour-
age workers in private industry to organize for collec-
tive "bargaining. During this period, trade unions have
been established as the recognized representatives of em-
ployees in most of the nation's large industrial complexes
Labor-management relations in private industry have
reached a high level of complexity and sophistication.
They cover an extensive range of subject matter.
B. The Federal Employee Before 10988
Prior to IO988 there was little formal executive or
legislative policy on employee-management relations for
federal employees. The NLRA specifically excluded govern-
-1 o
ment employees from its provisions. and there was no
mandatory type of collective bargaining or arbitration.
This is not to say that there was no relationship at all,
as there was. As early as 1800, organizations of crafts-
men were active in industrial complexes such as Naval
19
Shipyards. In 1912, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was
passed which allowed postal employees to become affilia-
ted with outside unions so long as such unions imposed
no obligation to strike, or assist in strikes against
18. NLRA § 2(2).
19. 37 Stat, at Large 55 (1912)

the United States, which, practice is still prohibited
20and is a criminal offense, and the objectives of the
union were for the improvement of labor conditions for
its members. By implied extension of this Act, it has
become an accepted principle that any federal employee
has the right to join any employee organization which
does not assert the right to strike against or advocate
the overthrow of the government. As a result, there were
before 10988 some one-half million postal employees and
many thousands of Tennessee Valley Authority employees
who were union members and enjoyed full-scale collective
bargaining with management, and it has worked success-
21fully. Since 1951 j the Federal Personnel Manual has
contained provisions which encourage government officials
to solicit and consider the views of government employees
22in the formulation of personnel policy. it has only
been since 1958, however, that this policy has been in-
terpreted to apply to employer organizations as well as
23
employees generally. It is noted that the above union
20. 5 U.S.C. H8(p) (1955).
21. TVA had 90% of its employees covered by union
contracts prior to IO988. Eighty-nine percent of postal
employees were covered. Dep't of Labor Inf. Bull.
(June 30, 1962).
22. Task Force Rep., pt. I at p. 4.
23. Ibid .
8

activity was allowed by the government but not permitted
as a matter of right.
The slow and limited progress of government encour-
agement of consultations with unions within government
prior to IO988 make it come as somewhat of a surprise
that some 33$ of all federal employees, consisting of
762,000 persons, belonged to some type of employee
2k
organization. This matched almost precisely the na-
tional proportion of organized workers in non-agricultural
establishments, exclusive of federal employment, which
was 32.4$ in i960. It was a proportion half again as
great as the total labor force, in which 23-3$ of the
workers organized.
The unions government employees belonged to prior
to IO988 were in large part the same unions that repre-
sented their counterparts in the private sphere. The
question immediately arises why so many joined unions
when management in many instances would not have any re-
lations with them. It is probably attributable in part
2k. Membership in any employee organization is allow-
able even though the organization might not have bean
recognized by a government agency.
25. Rep. of the President's Task Force on Employee-
Management Relations in the Fed. Serv. (1961), pt. I,
-o. 2 /hereinafter cited as Task Force Rep_J/'

to unions being able to help the government employee
through indirection in the form of lobbying and other
political maneuvers. As an example, minimum wages
were established by law but could be adjusted upward by
Agency heads as the result of wages of industry in the
local economy. 27 j± s early as l86l, the unions helped
persuade Congress to pass laws basing the pay of cer-
tain workers on those wages paid for similar work to
non-government workers in the same area. ° This is the
basis for the pay of some 700 , 000 blue collar workers
today. This in effect gave, and still gives, the govern-
ment employee the benefit of union bargaining in the
private sphere.
The unions flooded employees with literature as-
serting that the unions were responsible for various
accomplishments and enlisting membership to enable the
program to continue. For example, the AFGE claimed as
achievements: "Health and insurance programs with
government paying part of premiums j a two-step classified
pay increase in 19&0; eight classified pay raises between
26. See A.F.G.E. Pamphlet "AFGE All Sections Are
Go. Govt. Employee Directed" (i960).
27. 10 IT.S.C. 7474 (1956) (Navy authority).
28. Meyers, Do You Know Labor.
10

19^5 and i960 totaling 80$; Friday off when a legal holi-
day falls on Saturday; government financed training pro-
grams; increased retirement and survivor benefits," and
29
many others. These things are today realities, "but
this writer questions whether any union can claim full
credit for their achievement. Enough employees were con-
vinced, however, to account for the large percentage of
union membership set out; above.
Federal employees who had union affiliation before
IO988, and today, too, consisted primarily of postal em-
3 1ployees and blue collar workers. Most of the blue
collar workers are employed in industrial establishments
much like those in the private economy and are paid ac-
cording to rates prevailing at nearby private industry. -><*
This percentage is not surprising considering only klfo
29. See n. 26 supra .
30. AFL-CIO pamphlet, "AFG-E Program for Progress"
(1959).
31. Task Force Rep., pt. I at 3.
32. 10 U.S.C. § 7474 (1956). This section au-
thorizes the SECNAV, where there is no other law estab-
lishing rates for wages, to establish wages as nearly as
is consistent with the public interest with those of
private establishments in the immediate vicinity. There
are similar type regulations for all agency heads.
11

IoT federal employees are in the classified service and
33only a part of these are white collar -workers.
Considering arguendo all of the union claims of
achievement for government employees before IO98S are
true, they were limited compared to what they could do
for the civilian counterpart. Even with the limitations
however, the federal employee's lot was tenable.
Whereas the unions were continually bargaining with em-
ployers for such things as a shorter work day, a five-
day week, employee insurance, research of labor conditions,
and equitable promotion, all to be furnished by the em-
ployer, the federaleemployee already had many of these
benefits established by law or regulation. As an ex-
ample, promotions were determined and based on ability
under the Civil Service Merit System. A comprehensive
retirement system allowed retirement after as little as
five years 1 service if disabled and at age sixty with
thirty years 1 service. Allowance for paid sick leave
and annual leave on a progressive basis depending on time
employed, as well as numerous federal holidays, were
33. White collar workers are normally those persons
in civil service in the graded or general schedule who
are on salary. Blue collar workers are those workers
who are ungraded, not on a salary schedule, but receive
wages instead under the crafts' protective and custodial
schedule. See 63 Stat. 954; 5 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1153 (19^9)
12

provided for. Group life insurance at low rates was
available, as well as disability insurance. Working con-
ditions were continually studied. All of the above and
many other protections and benefits were and still are
available. All these provisions are reduced to writing
in the Federal Personnel Manual, Civil Service Regula-
tions, and other agency directives. Even though these
benefits were available, neither the employee or his
union representative had any part in their formulation.
This of course put the employee in the position of ac-
cepting what he was given. Executive Order No. IO9S8
has at least partially changed this by providing, as a
matter of right, for the recognition of unions and their
right to be consulted on personnel matters.
13

CHAPTER III
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. IO988 - ITS BEGINNING
For many years prior to 1962 it was generally ac-
cepted "by those in government and labor alike that a
"better understanding" of employee management relations
34
was needed. This lack of* understanding was surely
caused as a result of improper communication between man-
agement and labor. This problem became more and more
pertinent over the years as the federal government be-
35
came the largest single employer in the United States. ^
As a result of this situation, on June 22, 1962., Presi-
dent Kennedy appointed a Task Force on Employee Manage-
ment Relations in the Federal Service. This Force con-
sisted of Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor; John
¥. Macy, Jr., U. S. Civil Service Commissioner; David
E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget; J. Edward Day,
Postmaster General, and Theodore Sorenson, Special Con-
sultant to the President.
34. Task Force Rep., p. II at p. 8.
35. In Jan., 1964 the Dep J t of Labor estimated that
by June 1964 there would be 2,512,400 U. S. civil ser-
vants, 1,039,293 of whom would be employed by Dep J t of
Defense. As of June 1965, there should be 2,511*200 and
1,021,751 in the Dep J t of Defense. GERR 20, A3 (19^4)
.
14

In 1962 some six months were spent by the Task
Force holding hearings on the pro's and con's of what
should be done to improve relations between government
management and labor. Those who testified represented
all interests and included union officials, employers,
arbitrators, and attorneys. The large majority of those
who testified, as well as the Task Force members them-
3<$
selves, had worked 2 or many years with the NLRA. This
fact is of importance as such a background could not but
have helped influence the thinking and planning that went
into the final drafting of IO988. As will be discussed
subsequently, this fact, in this writer 1 s opinion, has
and will have a major influence on the interpretation and
carrying out of the Order.
November 30, 1961 found the Task Force's work com-
37pleted and IO988 was recommended. Subsequently the
President concurred in the recommendation and promulgated
0^ 36. Honorable John ¥. Macy, Jr., formerly President
of Macy 1 s Dep ' t Stores; Honorable David E. Bell, former-
ly President, Bell & Howell Optical Co.; Honorable
Robert F. .mara, formerly President, Ford Motor Co.
;
Honorable J. Arthur Goldberg, formerly General Counsel,
AFL-CIO Industrial Dep't; Honorable J. Edward Day,
formerly Solicitor, Prudential Life Ins. Co., and Theo-
dore C. Sorenson, attorney and politician.
37. Letter from President's Task Force on Employee-
Management Relations in Fed. Serv. to President of
United States, Nov. 30, 1961.
15

10988 by the authority granted him by the Constitution
of the United States.
3
s Section 13(G) f IO988 called
Tor the implementation of a Federal Employee Management
Relations Program. On May 21, 1963, President Kennedy
issued for application to all agencies covered by IO988
39the Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations
and The Code of Fair Labor Practices in the Federal Serv-
hQ
ice. The Code created employee rights in excess of
those specifically granted by section 1 of IO988 and the
Standards enumerated the position the employee must main-
tain. They, in effect, set out the detailed operating
instructions for the Order. ' f •'
Since the inception of the Order, the question of
its Constitutionality has been raised by the National
Federation of Government Employees (jNFFGE), an independent
conservative union which has filed suit in the Federal
Y1 3&. U.S. Const, art. II.
39. Standards of Conduct for Employee Organiza-
tions and Code of Fair Labor Practices, pt. B. Code of
Fair Labor Practices, 28 Fed. Reg. 5127 (1963) /herein-
after cited as Standards/.
k-0. Standards of Conduct for Employee Organiza-
tions and Code of Fair Labor Practices, pt. B, Code of
Fair Labor Practices, 28 Fed. Reg. 5129 (1963) /.herein-
after cited as Code/. '
16

4i
District Court in Washington, D. C. The complaint
specifically alleges 10988 exceeds the authority the
President has under any law cr statute in force. Ac-
cordingly, injunctive relief has been requested. It is
further alleged that IO988, Section 6, as interpreted "by
the Secretaries of the K'avy and Defense, J is in viola-
tion of the first amendment insofar as the membership is
unable to select spokesmen of their choice, namely super-
visory personnel. Supervisory employees are prohibited
from holding office, though the}'" may be members of the
organization. It would appear that the President is
within his authority inasmuch as IO988 is no more than an
order concerning the administrative function of govern-
ment. As to supervisors holding office in the union, it
would certainly be an unbearable impasse because of the
conflict of interest that would result in management
41. Xat'l Fed*n of Fed. Employees /hereinafter
cited as NFFE/, an unincorporated ass*n, and Annapolis
Local 124NFFE and Leonard A. Ruggiero v. Paul H. Nitze,
SECNAV and Robert S. MacNamara, Sec. of Defense, and
F. H. Huron, Capt USN, in U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of
Colom. Civil Action No. (196k ).
42. Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions 5(3)E
/hereinafter cited as NCPl/.
43. Dep't of Defense Directive 1426.1, IV, H(l)
(June 15, 1962) (superseded by_Dep*t of Defense Direc-
tive 1426.1 V (18 Aug. 1964) 2iiereinafter cited as DOD
1426.1/.
17

dealing with itself. As early as 1939 the Department
oT the Navy was confronted with supervisors taking an
active part in union activities. The problem arose be-
tween the International Association of Machinists (iANf)
and the Norfolk Navy Yard. The result was a directive
44prohibiting the practice.
In conclusion, it should be noted that since its
inception the growth in membership in unions under the
provisions of IO988 has been impressive and continuous.
For the period January 1962 through May 1964, employee
organizations have gained exclusive recognition for
244,000 employees, excluding Post Office workers, who have
490,000 members in 22,892 units. Within the defense
establishment, the Army has granted exclusive recognition
to 95 units, the Air Force 12, the Navy 140, and the De-
partment of Defense 2. 5 The AFL-CIO has predicted 70$-
90$ of some 800,000 per diem blue collar workers will be
46
organized by 1966. ' Beyond any question, 10988 has been
born and has a full life ahead.
44. SECNAV Dir. 721 (1939).
45. GERR 39, CI (1964).
46. Weekly Fed. Employees Digest, vol. 13, 35
(1964).
18

CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZING- RIGHTS
A. Protection of Members
Since the inception of 10988, federal employees
have been protected in their right to exercise freely
without penalty, fear, or reprisal, the right to join
or assist any employee organization or, conversely, not
hr,
to join xf they see fit. ' The freedom of employees to
assist such organizations is formally recognized as ex-
tending to participating in the organization and acting
for it in its relations with management. The head of
each executive department or agency is directed to take
appropriate action to see that federal employees under
their jurisdiction are afforded these rights, that no
interference, restriction, coercion, or discrimination
is practiced and that nothing is done to encourage or
discourage membership in employee organizations.
k7 . 10988 § 1.
48. Task Force Rep. pt. II, p. 12-13- The drafters
indicate those roles laid down by Congress for employee-
management relations in the private economy should be
carried over to the federal government in order to ensure
that the public interest and the interest of individual
employees are protected. It was felt that there were
many areas in the federal government where civil servants
have shown little or no inclination to join employee
organizations nor enter into collective (continued)
19

Employee participation in an organization will not ex-
clude them from acting as officers in such an organiza-
-cxon. They may not participate as officers, however,
if it would result in a conflict of interest causing
50incompatibility with their official duties. The
government as well as the union is entitled to some pro-
tection. This restriction would not, of course, apply
if the unit were a supervisory unit.
One controversial restriction on management during
the period of organization is the restriction on expres-
sing their opinion to the employees. Management must he
careful in the pre-election stage to avoid any act that
might express their like or dislike for unions. State-
ments made in public or through news media which might so
much as infer a preference must be avoided. / As an ex-
ample, labor leaders on occasion have invited management
officials to debate the pro's and con's of union organi-
zation at open meetings, which of course would disclose
management's position and might influence prospective
48. (Continued) relationships with management offi-
cials. Thus the right of the employee to join or refuse
to join should be protected. There should be no compul-
sion in either direction.
•V$>. DOD 1426.1 V,A (1964).
50. 10988 § l(b); DOD 1426.1 V 1(3) (1964)..
20

union members in their decisions. This might be fatal.
It is not a question of what management actually thinks,
but what prospective union members think they think.
The object is to keep the atmosphere pure. On the other
hand, the agency head must see that all of his employees
are made aware of their rights under the provisions of
IO988. Under no circumstances are any employees to be
criticized or have their status in any way affected be-
cause of their association with a labor organization.
This philosophy has been so closely followed that where
a forged newspaper article was published with false in-
formation about the union prior to the election and the
51
union subsequently lost, a new election was ordered.-'
This was so even though it was conclusively shown that
the government did not release the article and was, in
fact, ignorant of its release. Government employers
must maintain strict neutrality in speaking to their em-
ployees concerning union representation. In the private
sphere, Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act allows the
employer to express his opinion to his employees as long
as it does not involve a threat of reprisal, force or
promise of benefit. 0l<^
51. Pensacola Naval Air Station, GERR 40, (ARB)
39 (196^).
21

This gag restriction on government management, as
opposed to the civilian philosophy, is not desirable
and should be removed. The restriction in itself infers
that government management is not to be trusted with
their employees to the degree their civilian counter-
parts are. This is certainly in conflict with 10988*
s
general tenor of protecting the employee from embarking
on a venture he does not understand. It appears inequit-
able to let unions present all their arguments as to the
good of unions and not allow management to present their
position, where appropriate. If this restriction on man-
agement were removed, the union could still appeal under
Section 11 if it believed management T s actions caused
the election to be unfair, just as they can now on other
election and unit controversies. The standards for arbi-
tration of election controversies under 10988 are con-
sidered higher than those under the NLRB under the present
practice, because of management not being able to speak. >
The NLRB criteria would appear adequate. The NLRB
stated, in Lane Drug Stores , Inc." and in Bloomingdale
Brothers, "the test is whether the conduct charged
52. Id. at kl.
53. Lane Drug Stores, Inc., 88 NLRB 58k (±950
$k. Bloomingdale Brothers, 87 NLRB 1326 (19^9
22

against the employer was reasonably calculated to inter-
fere with the employee's free choice." This test, with
a careful examination of the facts to determine if there
were any threats of reprisal or force, or promise of bene-
fit, appears to the writer to be a proper criteria for
10988 practice.
Generally speaking, the right of employees to organize
can proceed unrestricted and management will do nothing
to discourage it.
B. What Is An Employee Organization?
An employee organization has been defined under IO988
as :
Any lawful association, labor organization,
federation, council or brotherhood having as a
primary purpose the improvement of working condi-
tions among federal employees; and any craft,
trade or industrial union whose membership in-
cludes or is open to both federal employees and
employees of private organizations. This shall
not include any organization (l) which asserts
the right to strike against the Government of
the United States or any agency thereof, or to
assist or participate in any such strike, or
which imposes a duty or obligation to conduct,
assist, or participate in any such strike, or
(2) which advocates the overthrow of the consti-
tutional form of Government in the United States,
or (3) which discriminates with regard to the
terms or conditions of membership because of
race, color, creed, or national origin, 55 or
(4) which is determined by the Secretary of
55. 10988 i 2.
23

Defense, after consultation with the national
office of a union, if any, of the employee
organization concerned, to be subject to cor-
rupt influences or to the influence of any
party, movement, or other group which is op-
posed to basic democratic principles. "5^
Certain groups of government employees are not al-
lowed to unionize, such as the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the Central Intelligence Agency, or any other
agency whose primary duty is ~co perform intelligence,
57investigative or security functions.-" Within the De-
partment of Defense this would include such agencies as
58the Defense Intelligence Agency. in addition, those
employee organizations composed predominantly of non-
United States citizens located outside of the United
States are excluded from organizing, i^
56. 10988 § 3-
57. 10988 § 16; DOD 1426.1 Bl (196*0
58. DOD 1426.1 III Bl (1964).
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CHAPTER V
WHAT IS A UNIT?
A. Basic Criteria
Interwoven with the unit problem is the question of
recognition, which is discussed subsequently in Part VI.
For the purpose of this discussion, it is necessary to
realize that there are four types of recognition: in-
formal, formal, exclusive, and national. Formal, ex-
clusive, and national recognition can be granted only
after a determination of what constitutes a unit. This
is so for formal recognition, as there can be no formal
recognition unless 10% of the unit are members of the
organization. Even though the formally recognized organi-
zation only represents its own members, the membership
must be a representative group within the unit. The
unit must be determined before exclusive recognition is
granted because such a union represents all in the
unit, and the number of votes or proven membership neces-
sary for recognition is based on a percentage of the
unit. National recognition does not even become an
issue until large numbers have been granted formal or
exclusive recognition.// ^
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Inasmuch as the unit controversies are between
the agency and union, an examination of what the agency
is is necessary. In the past two years, much conflict
has revolved around the definition of the word "agency."
Section 1A of IO988 states, "The head of each executive
department and agency (hereafter referred to as an
agency) shall take such action consistent with law .
etc." Section 6B states in part, "The agency and sub-
ject employee organizations, through appropriate offi-
cials . . . etc." The controversy has arisen as to who
the agency is, the installation or the appropriate de-
partment. Arbitrator Charles 0. Gregory, in an arbi-
tration decision between the Naval Ammunition Depot
,
Saint Julien's Creek
,
Portsmouth, Virginia , and the In -
ternational Association of Machinists (iAM), and the
59
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), con-
sidered the definition of the word agency. Professor
Gregory stated that, in his opinion, the agency involved
was not Saint Julien's Creek Ammunition Depot, but the
Department of the Navy. Throughout the decisions this
60definition has been followed. The Civil Service
59. U.S. Naval Ammunition Depot, St. Julien's Creek,
Portsmouth, Va
.
, GERR 1, (ARE) 1 (1963).
60. Long Beach Naval Shipyard, GERR 5, (ARB) 39
(1963); Norfolk Naval Shipyard, GERR 6, (ARB) kj (1963);
Boston Naval Shipyard, GERR 9, (ARB) 69 (1963); Puget
sound Naval Shipyard, GERR 7, (ARB) kj (1963).
2.6

Commission, 61 and the Department of Defense, have
further agreed with this definition.
A unit has been defined as "a grouping of employees
for purposes of formal or exclusive recognition. A unit
may be established on organization, occupational, or
functional lines depending upon what in a particular
situation constitutes a clear and identifiable community
of interest among the employees involved. " Units will
be established on a basis which will insure a clear and
identifiable community of interest among the employees
concerned. The determination as to whether a clear and
identifiable community of interest exists is necessarily
a flexible one and must be made in light of specific cir-
cumstances. In making such determinations, factors such
as organizational structure, which is the degree to which
a managerial executive has control of and authority to
act on negotiable personnel matters, similarity of
skills, distinctiveness of function, and integrated work
6kprocess should be considered. Although functionally
C/tfl. FPM, ch. 711-3, 1(3)-
62. DOD 1426.1, VII, A (196k). The final determina-
tion of unit designation rests with the agency head.
63. Id. at VII, B.
A. U.S. Naval Air Station, Oceana, Va., GERR 11,
(AR3) 81 (1963).
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distinct organizational units exist which may be estab-
lished as separate units, the existence of an integrated
work group may make it more practicable to have one
large unit than a number of separate units. -> The De-
partment of Defense has directed that the final determi-
nation in controversies over exclusive recognition is
the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense or the
appropriate Secretary of the military department con-
cerned. In the event that there is a controversy over
the unit determination, provision has been made in 10988
to request the Secretary of Labor to appoint an arbitra-
67
tor to make an advisory opinion.
B. Determination Problems
It would seem that little difficulty should arise
in making unit determinations. This has not been the
case. A large number of the arbitration decisions under
Section 11 have revolved around installations within
various agencies denying more than one unit on an in-
stallation. These determinations by the commanding offi-
cers of the various installations have been forwarded to
65. DOD 1^26.1, VII C (1964).
66. Id. at VII B.
67. 29 CFR 25 (1963); 10988 § 11
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the appropriate agency head, who has upheld them. These
have resulted in appointment of arbitrators under Sec-
tion 11 of 10988.
/To
In the Long Beach Naval Shipyard decision, the
shipyard commander's position and the position taken by
the Department of the Navy was that the only appropriate
unit of the shipyard was a unit consisting of all its
employees. Similar craft units or other functional units
were alleged to be not appropriate for lack of a clear
and identifiable community of interest distinct from
those of all other shipyard employees. The American
Federation of Technical Engineers, Local 17^ (AFTE), had
petitioned the commander of the shipyard seeking exclu-
sive recognition pursuant to Section 6 of IO988 as the
representative of a unit of technical employees employed
by the shipyard. The arbitrator held that all profes-
sional, technical employees, draftsmen, equipment
specialists, contract specialists, quality control
specialists, illustrators, and other technical employees
listed could constitute a separate appropriate unit for
the purpose of exclusive recognition under 10988.
Further, professional employees, including architects,
68. Long Beach Naval Shipyard, GERR 5, (ARB) 39
(1963).
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engineers, chemists, mathematicians and metallurgists,
could be included in the unit if they consented. The
position of installation commanders was that it is de-
sirable to have only one unit on an installation inas-
much as it is easier to deal with one organization than
many, and it would interfere with installation community
of interest if more than one unit were on an installa-
tion .
69The Fort Benning , Georgia , arbitration was the
first Army case where the unit question was arbitrated.
The Army contended that since IO988 states that a unit
may be based on a plant or installation, a craft, or a
function, there was no need to further explore any "com-
munity of interest" since the community of interest
existed by definition in IO98S. They further argued
that once a unit is proposed on one of the above three
bases, it has a built-in community of interest which is
clear and identifiable, making such a \mit intrinsically
appropriate. Arbitrator Roger ¥illiams held that their
interpretation was incorrect, as the Executive Order did
not intend that there could be only one appropriate unit.
69. U.S. Army Infantry Training Center, Ft. Benning,
Ga., GERR 2, (ARB) 9 (1963); Boston Naval Shipyard,
GERR 6, (ARB) 43 (1963).
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If the requirements were met it merely indicated that
that particular unit was appropriate, but there could
be others
.
In the Navy, the Bureau of Ships in general has ada-
mantly refused to grant unit recognition to any individual
union other than activity-wide units at naval ship3^ards
.
70The decisions at the Naval Shipyards at Norfolk
.,
Boston, Long Beach
,
72 Portsmouth
,
73 and Puget Sound
are examples. The arbitrators found in these cases that
separate units should be recognized and the Navy's posi-
tion of activity-wide units was overruled. This same
decision has been followed in numerous other cases
where installation commanders attempted to establish sta-
tion or activity-wide units.
Arbitrator Roger Williams, in discussing Section 6A
of the Order, states that the test for the appropriate-
ness of a unit under 6A in considering the language
"units may be established on any plant or installation,
craft, functional or other basis which will ensure a
clear and identifiable community of interest among the
70. Norfolk Naval Shipyard, GERR 9, (ABB) 69 (19^3
)
71. Boston Naval Shipyard, GERR 00, (ARB) 1 (1963).
72. Case cited note 23 supra .
73. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, GERR l c5, (ARB) 10
(1963).
74. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, GERR 7, (ARB) k7
(1963).
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employees concerned ..." indicates to him that the
interpretation should be "an" appropriate unit rather
15than "the" appropriate unit. Thi s further establishes
the concept that an automatic installation—wide unit
was not intended under 10988. There have been some ex-
ceptions. 7° In tlie Saint Julien's Creek decision, the
issue presented was whether the unit determination should
be for the depot as a whole or cwo units, one consisting
of graded employees and the other, ungraded. Saint
Julien's Creek being a Naval Ammunition Depot, it was
held that there was not a readily identifiable division
of interest between the graded and the ungraded employees
at the Depot. The graded and ungraded employees worked
directly alongside one another and the entire group was
so interwoven and had such a common objective of indus-
trial interest for producing and supplying adequate
ammunition to the Navy that they were inseparable, both
in their common relationships to the object for which the
ammunition depot exists and their mutual employment in-
terests. Accordingly, Hi". Gregory recommended that
there be only one unit at this particular installation.
75. Post Eng'r, Ft. Benning, Ga . , GEPJ3. 2, (ARB) ik
(1963).
76. U.S. Naval Ammunition Depot, St. Julien's Creek,
GEPJt 1, (ARB) 1 (1963).
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77
In the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center decision,
Arbitrator Marshall decided against a separate unit for
the IAM in favor of an installation-wide unit. He
stated that the mission of the Apollo program of landing
an American on the moon in this decade is an integrated
program entailing "building rockets and thus all con-
cerned had a common interest . The Gregory and Marshall
decisions are the only cases in the military sphere
where separate units have not been granted by advisory
78decision. These cases point out that it is possible
to have a single installation-wide unit recommended by
an arbitrator depending upon the individual circumstances,
even though as a normal rule this has not been done.
This is not to imply that there are not many installation-
wide units, as there are, but they are in those installa-
tions where neither the union nor the government requested
arbitration. An installation-wide unit, of course, is
desirable to the government, as they only have one
77. George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, GERR
30, (ajrb) 27 (1964).
78. A search of advisory opinions and contracts to
date has shown no case where the recommendations of the
arbitrator have not been followed by the agency. This
indicates that so-called "advisory opinions" have be-
come defacto opinions.
33

union to deal with. As a result of this apparent mis-
understanding of the Order as far as unit determina-
tions are concerned, a memorandum was issued by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Norman S. Paul, clari-
fying Department of Defense Directive 1^26.1 (1962) in
79regard to recognizing official units. y The memorandum
made it quite plain that the intent of 10938 as to unit
determinations under the Executive Order, and the De-
partment of Defense Directives, was one of flexibility
dependent upon the specific facts in a particular case,
and no general rule was to be predetermined nor any
particular type of unit prevented by an agency or in-
stallation. Also, there could be no limit set on the
number of appropriate units which could be established
80
at any installation, or any limit on the number of
81
persons in a particular unit.
At one time, the NLRB position was that the interests
of technical employees were so different from those of
production and maintenance that they would automatically
79. Memorandum of Norman S. Paul, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense, Manpower to Secretaries of Army., Navy,
Air Force (Dec. 21, 1962)
.
80. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 NLRB 409 (1950);
Edwards Air Force Base, GERR 30, (ARB) 37 (1964).
81. Ibid. Edwards Air Force Base.
3h

be separate Tor unit purposes. jn 1961 tne NLRB
decided automatic rules were basically poor and that
each case should be independently considered, based on
the parties' desires, skills, functions, supervision,
83
and contact with other employees. This, in effect,
is the position Mr. Paul has adopted and what he has set
forth in his memorandum as cited. The language in the
8kSheffield Corp. Case and Mr. Paul's are almost identi-
cal .
C. NLRB Influence
The closest IO988 comes to being regulated by the
decisions of the NLRB are those cases where unit contro-
versies concerning exclusive recognition or election
proceedings are involved. The Secretary of Labor, as
directed by IO988, nominates arbitrators when requested
by employee organizations or agencies from the national
panel of arbitrators maintained by the Federal Mediation
86
and Conciliation Service. The expense is borne equally
32. Litton Industries of Maryland, Inc., 125 NLRB
722 (1959).
83. Sheffield Corp., 134 NLRB 1101 (1961).
8k. Ibid .
85- 29 CFR 25 (1963); 10988 § 11.
86. 29 CFR pt. 25, § 25.5 (1963) •
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87by the parties. The very fact that the arbitrators
are appointed from the national panel of arbitrators is
in itself indicative that their decisions might be in-
fluenced by the decisions of the NLRB . This becomes a
stronger possibility when a list of some of the persons
who have been appointed arbitrators is examined and it
is recognized that they normally arbitrate disputes over
contract interpretation and unit and election disputes
in the civilian sphere
.
It is the opinion of this writer that as of this
date a realistic approach to unit disputes should be a
recognition that arbitrators follow the decisions of the
.RB as concerns unit determinations. Though most of the
arbitrators, in their decisions, have been careful to pay
lip service to the fact that the decisions of the NLRB
are not binding on the interpretation of 10988, they
nevertheless state that they are very pertinent and go
so far as to cite NLRB cases as a basis for their deci-
89
sion. Some examples of arbitrators' positions are
87- 29 CFR pt. 25, § 25.7 (1963).
88. Charles Gregory, Phillip Taft, Cornelius Peck,
Ralph Valtin, Paul Prasow.
89. Naval Research Lab., GERR 10, (ARB) 77 (1963);
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, GERR 5, (ARB) 39 (1963); Boston
Naval Shipyard, GERR 6, (ARB) k"} (1963). A search of the
arbitration to date discloses no case where the arbitra-
tor has stated he was bound by NLRB decisions.
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90the Naval Research Laboratory arbitration decision,
made by Roll Valtin. He stated:
"I do not consider myself bound by past unit
determinations by the NLRB, but the distinc-
tion which the Board has made between blue
collar and white collar employees is such a
classic one, and one that is nowadays so widely
accepted, that I do not see how it can be
reasonably cast aside."
Harold ¥. Daney, in the U . S . Army Rock I s 1and Ar serial
decision," stated:
"This is not an NLRB proceeding, but a pro-
ceeding under Executive Order 10988 . The arbi-
trator derives his authority from appointment
pursuant to said Order and ;ouncl by its
terms. To stress this basic fact is not in-
tended to derogate from the importance or perti-
nence of NLRB policies on unit issues as they
may be relevant to this proceeding.
"
Hugo P. Black, Jr., in the Pensacola Naval Air Station
92decision, used the NLRA as a guide to determine what
standard of "purity" should be used in determining the
standard for elections. He said the government standard
should be at least as high as private industry under
NLRB. Edward R. Teple, in the ¥right-Patterson Air
90. Naval Research Lab., Washington, D. C, GERR
10, (ARB) 77 (1963).
91. U.S. Army Rock Island Arsenal, GERR 18,
(ARB) 1 (1964).
92. U.S. Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla.,
GERR 40, (ARB) 39 (1964).
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93Base decision, made a comparison between safety fea-
tures set out under Section 9^(3) of "lie Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act for the private sphere with, the
Government's responsibility, and stated: "The arbitra-
tor fails to see any distinction between government
operation and the conduct of private business in this
respect." Alpheus R. Marshall, in the George C. Marshall
9kSpace Flight Center decision/ stated that NLRB deci-
sions should be persuasive as to the interpretation of
10988 though not necessarily controlling. Mr. Marshall
95then forthwith cited the Boeing Aircraft: Co. decision
for the proposition "the manufacturing of missiles is so
complex as to make comparison with ordinary manufacturing
plants misleading." This he used in deciding there
should not be a separate unit recognized at the NASA in-
stallation .
To further emphasize the reliance with which the
arbitrators appointed by the Secretary of Labor are in-
fluenced by the NLRB, the following language reveals
Arbitrator Cornelius J. Peck's views on this subject, as
96
stated in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard decision::
93. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, GERR kO , (ARB)
(1964).
9k. George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, GERR 30,
(ARB) 27 (1964).
95. Boeing Aircraft Co., ik NLRB 103 (1955).
96. Long Beach Naval Shipyard, GERR 5, (ARB) 39 (1963)
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"A reading of the Executive Order
soon reveals that it is patterned after the
National Labor Relations Act. The 'recogni-
tion' and 'appropriate unit' referred to
throughout the Order obviously have their
origins in that Act. Section 6 of the Order
utilized terms that have become intimately
familiar to practitioners of the labor law:
'exclusive representative,' 'has been desig-
nated or selected by a majority of "che em-
ployees', and the following:
'Units may be established on any
plant or installation which will
ensure a clear and identifiable
community of interest among the
employees concerned, but no unit
shall be established solely on
the basis of the extent to which
employees in the proposed unit
have organized. '
"
Peck emphasizes that the provisions of Sec-
tion 6(l) (4) of IO988 coincide with the provisions of
Section 9(b)(l)-(3) of the NLRA. He then stated:
"It is apparent, therefore, that the Order
describes its substantive mandates in broad
terms and that those terms incorporate the
broad body of experience developed under
the NLRA since 1935- The decisions of the
NLRB are therefore highly relevant with re-
spect to unit determinations made under
the Order .
"
Finally as late as January 1965, in the U.S. Marine
97Corps Air Station Cherry Point, >. . C . decision/' Arbi-
trator George Savage stated:
97. U.S. Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point
N.C. and IAM, 98 NAV-BUT-/EPS-13 (Jan. 1965) .
°9j

"Sweeping aside any obli on to be bound
by Board decisions, it is obvious no in-
formad arbitrator is going to be unmindful
of the principles and policies hammered out
by the NLRB in the thirty years of experi-
ence in determining appropriate units. And
no one seeking to be informed on doubtful
points will ignore such a wealth of ma-
terial . . . . "
In view of the above decisions, there can be little
doubt that arbitrators are using NLRB decisions as a
basis for their decisions under IO988. This being "che
case, some consideration should be given to NLRB deci-
sions in connection with unit controversies.
D. Some Pertinenx NLRB Unit Decisions
Any attempt to discuss and cite all the NLRB deci-
sions cited by arbitrators in the advisory opinions under
10988 would, of course, be futile. Some of the key de-
cisions and their basis are deemed appropriate and in-
formative to better understand their effect on IO9S8,
Section 11 decisions. Under the NLRA, it is most common
for questions to arise in considering unit determina-
tions as to whether a particular craft or trade should
be granted recognition.
98In the Long Beach Naval Shipyard ^ decision, Arbi-
trator Peck made an analogy between Shipyard commanders
98. Ibid .
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denying recognition other than to an installation-wide
unit and the position of the NLRB shortly after the
passage of the Taft-Hartley legislation. He pointed
out that at that time the NLRB in some instances said
the crafts were not separable "because the already estab-
lished stable bargaining relationship overcame the
benefits that would be derived from the severance.
This position was adopted for the steel industry in
i ahP 99 100±y^°3 the aluminum industry in 1950? the lumber in-
, 101dustry in 19^9? and the wet milling industry in
TOJ Q 102±y LcO
.
This situation was not completely analogous
to the Shipyard commanders 1 position, as in the Shipyard
cases it was not a question ox craft severance, but one
of initial recognition. The facts in the American Pot-
103
a sh and Chenical Corp . case decided by the NLRB in
1954 are more analogous to initial recognition. That
case held that prior policy against craft severance
would be limited to the industries previously designated,
and that in all future cases it would find the craft
99. Nat'l Tube Co., 76 .NLRB 1199 (19^8).
100. Permanenta Metal Corp., 89 NLRB IO76 (19^9).
101. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 80 NLRB 362 (19^8).
102. Corn Products Refining Co., 80 NLRB 362 (19^8)
103. Am. Potash and Chem. Corp , 107 NLRB 1418
(1954).
kl

unit appropriate for severance where a true craft unit
was sought by a union which traditionally represented
that craft.
Congress, in 1959, when it passed the Labor Manage-
ment Report and Disclosure Act, making substantial re-
visions in certain portions of the I\TLRA, made no change
in those sections pertaining to unit determinations
which, in effect, put its stamp of approval on the methods
used by the NLRB in making a unit determination. Even
when considering American Potash , the facts are not com-
pletely analogous, as in that case a severance is being
dealt with. However, the fact that the NLRB will allow
crafts to be severed from already established units is
a more drastic step than an initial recognition of a
craft. There would, therefore, appear to be no sound
logic in not recognizing a craft initially and using
the American Potash series of cases as authority. A late
example of the application of the American Potash ra-
tionale can be found in the U. S. Marine Corps Air Sta -
104
tion decision, decided on January 21, 19^5 • Arbitrator
George Savage King, in deciding co grant an initial
craft recognition, stated:
104. Note 98 supra.
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"
. . lie is in accord with NLRB cases which
have held that proof of a true craft unit is
proof of community of interest. This is be-
cause by definition a true craft includes
those criteria used to determine community of
interest .
"
Arbitrator Savage, previous to the above quotation,
where reference is made to "NLRB cases," had discussed
at length Potash and related cases, recognizing that
they were severance cases as distinguished from cases
of initial recognition. Nevertheless, he used the prin-
ciples set forth therein as a basis for unit determina-
tion. It can be expected in the future that crafts will
be asking for severance from larger units, and there can
be little question but that the severance will be
granted.
A clear example of craft unit recognition can be
105
found in the case of the pattern makers . Pattern
makers have long been recognized as a special craft and
they have maintained an organization going back to the
19th century, to which a large part of the practitioners
of the craft can trace their ancestry. It has been
105. Pattern makers cut patterns and make models us-
ing both wood and metal. They are few in number, and some
units have only several members. Charleston Naval Ship-
yard, GERR 39, C8 (1964). Portsmouth,_New Hampshire
Naval Shipyard, GERR 39 (C-9) (196':-) /l6 members,/.
106. Am. Potash and Chem. Corp., 107 NLRB 1^18 (195*0 •
Craft is defined as a distinct and homogenous group of
skilled journeymen working as such together with their
apprentices and/or helpers.
h3

argued on occasion that pattern making is an apprentice
trade, and that the work of the craft is carried on
107successfully by pattern makers and their helpers. '
Once again the NLRB, in the American Potash decision,
stated that craft units are severable from industrial
type units and the community of interest of the craft
group outweighs the community of interest with all
workers employed. This was further confirmed in the
108
Kennecutt Copper Corporation case. "Where a true
craft group is sought, and in addition the union seek-
ing to represent the craft has a history of repre-
senting such a craft traditionally, there should be a
severance and the craft recognized if NLRB decisions are
followed. This would be particularly true where an ini-
tial determination is being made. This has been almost
consistently done in advisory arbitration of decisions
under Section 11 of 10988. The only decision to the
contrary as to craft units is that decided by Lawrence R,
Seibel in the David Taylor Model Basin decision, "^
107. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, GERR 7, (ARB) 53
(1963).
108. Kennecott Copper Corp., 138 NLRB 118 (1962).
109. Long Beach Naval Shipyard, GERR 5, (ARB) 39
1963); Am. Potash and Chem. Corp., 107 NLRB l4l8
1950).
110. David Taylor, Model Basin, GERR 7, (ARB) 51
(1963).
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and this decision might be distinguished upon the ground
that in that case the metal trades counsel did not seek
to represent model makers who worked with metal, though
the skills of the employees in the unit sought were only
slightly greater than the metal model makers. Arbitra-
tor Seibel further noted that though he did not recognize
a unit of model makers (non-metal) for the purposes of
exclusive recognition, he suggested that such a unit
might be afforded formal recognition under 10938, Sec-
tion 5A. This would afford them a right to be heard.
He made it clear that he was not attempting to force the
model makers (non-metal) to join the Metal Trades Coun-
sel, which was to be afforded exclusive recognition for
ungraded blue collar workers, but they could if they
were determined to be a part of the bargaining unit.
E. Basis of Section 11 Arbitration to Date
From a study of the cases to date the rationale of
the arbitrators in arriving at their recommendations has
been generally similar in all cases. They have looked
toward the clear and identifiable community of interest
among the employees concerned. They have reasoned that
units which could demonstrate a community of interest,
such as craft groups, would be adequate. In making this
determination, they have considered the NLRB decisions
h5

as veil as other 10988 arbitration decisions in deter-
mining similarity of working conditions, skill and edu-
cation, geographical location of the work site, common
supervision, and integration of the work process within
the proposed unit. Of course, in each case all of the
above criteria were not necessarily conclusive, but were
usually considered. The decisions now make it clear that
the agency argument of only one formally recognized unit
per installation because of a common installation-wide
community of interest is not sound. This has been
further clarified by the Department of Defense as late
as 18 August 196k. 111
Considering both the IO988 decisions and NLRB deci-
sions, various categories of crafts or trades have been
recognized as being separable for unit purposes and for-
mal recognition. Clerical employees can normally be
112
represented as a separate unit if they so desire,
though usually they will be included in production and
a 113 • + llkintenance units; guards, painters,
111. DOD 1426.1 VI (196*0.
112. Donovan Constr. Co., 105 NLRB 704 (1953); Perm
Dixie Cement Corp., 107 NLRB 251 (1953)-
113. Mack Mfg. Corp., 107 NLRB 289 (1953); AFGE
Lodge 431; U.S. Army Armory, Springfield, Mass., GE.
39 C5 (1964).
114. Bhd. Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers
,
Local 1632 AFL-CIO, Ft. Meyer, Va., GERR 39, C-3 (l?64)
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-o- -o- t-j. 11 5 , j_ . . 11^ 117firexighters, electricians, toolmakers, lithog-
v,
118 11Q 120rapners, commissary store employees, inspectors,
121 122 123ships crew, steward officer. * ungraded employees, '
and many others too numerous to mention.
Though there is a restriction on more than one
organization having exclusive recognition within a single.
unit, under IO988 there can "be an indefinite number of
units within the installation having exclusive recogni-
tion. Conceivably ail of the above units could be on a
single installation. There have been occasions where a
single arbitration decision has recommended several units
124within a single installation. This, of course, puts
115. Fire Fighters, U.S. Naval Air Station, Roose-
velt Rds., Puerto Rico, GERR 39, C-10 (196k).
116. Int*l Bhd. Electrical Workers, Local 301 (iBEW),
Red River Depot, Tex., GERR 39, 0-5 (1964).
117. Nat'l Ass'n Govt. Employees (NAGE), Local R-l-3,
U.S. Armory, Springfield. Mass., GERR 39, C-5 (1964).
118. Am. Lithographers Ass'n (ALA) , Local 98, Naval
Oceanographic Office, Washington, D. C, GERR 39, C-7
(1964).
119. Am. Fed. Govt. Employees (AFGE), Lodge 1513,
Commissary Store, USNAS, Yhidbey Island, Wash., GERR 39,
C-9 (1964).
120. Nat'l Ass'n Govt. Insp. (NAGl), Unit 7, USMCAS
,
Chei-ry Point, N.C., GERR 39, C-9 (1964).
121. it'l Maritime Union (NMU) , Far East Area, MSTS
,
GERR 39, C-ll (1964) .
122. Military Sea Transport Union, Honolulu Office
MSTS; GERR 39, C-ll (1964).
123. Andrews Air Force Base, GERR 8, (ARB) 6.3 (1963).
124. U.S.N. Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Md .
,
GERR 23, (ARB) 7 (l$)64). Four separate units were recom-
mended in a single arbitration decision.
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management in the position of having to deal with each
exclusively recognized unit on an equal basis . The size
of a group does not necessarily prohibit its gaining ex-
clusive recognition if it meets the criteria discussed
previously. Units in the Armed Forces thai have been
125granted exclusxve recognioion range irom one to
9,800. 126
F. A Problem of Administration
It would appear that the unit problem is approaching
a satisfactory conclusion. This is not completely so,
however. The discretion on the part of agencies in imple-
menting their own instructions and interpreting 10988 is
127
causing administrative difficulty. There is no central
body to interpret the Order, nor are there any direct
lines of communication to the Secretary of Labor in those
cases he is allowed, under Section 11, to appoint
125. Military Sea Transport Union, Honolulu, MSTS
,
GERR 39, C-ll (1964)
.
126. Metal Trades Union, USN Shipyard, Brookland,
N.Y., GERR 39, C-8 (1964).
127. Address by Otto Prog FL-CIO Educ . Dep't,
to Govt, employees, N.Y. City, Nov. 19, 1963, GERR 20 >
C-l (1964); address of A. B. Gretta, Pres . , AFL-CIO
(1963), to Office of Industrial Relations, Dep't of
Navy, Washington, D. C. (19^3 ), GERR 4, El (1963).
kS

.,, , 128aroitrators. Under the present system, implementing
instructions have been drawn by the Civil Service Com-
mission, the Department of Labor, Health, Education and
Welfare, Treasury and Defense, as well as each of the
secretaries of the various agencies of the Armed Forces
and other agencies of the government. Consequently
s
even
though the Department of Labor has done a commendable job
in administering Section 11, it is necessary in each case
to go through the chain of command of each agency and its
subordinates in all of its transactions. One union might
have to go through arbitration with several agencies con-
sidering the same problem. This is a cumbersome, time-
consuming, and expensive procedure, as well as subjecting
all decisions to numerous interpretations by various agen-
cies concerned. The various unions have repeatedly com-
plained of this cumbersome process which must be followed
in establishing appropriate bargaining units and the
128. 10988 § 11. This sec. makes it discretionary
with each agency head to make determination as to the ap-
propriateness of a unit to be recognized exclusively.
There is a right established for either the installation
commander or organization to make a request to the agency
head for the appointment of an arbitrator by the Secretary
of Labor to make an advisory opinion co the agency head
as to the qualification of units for exclusive recogni-
tion and/or the supervision or judging of the fairness
of elections.
^9

majority representation. A desirable solution would be
to have a permanent administrative body, whether it be
the NLRB or some separately created body, which would be
in a position to publish and interpret one set of* imple-
menting' instructions that would be equally applicable to
all. This would also cause uniformity in decision making
and avoid duplication of effort for ail concerned, both
labor and management alike
.
Although the unit problems usually arise at the be-
ginning of the labor organization recognition, they are
not to be treated lightly. The inclusion or exclusion
of an organization from a unit can often have dire re-
sults on management or on the labor organization. It
will determine the number of units the government will
have to deal with and the power a unit will have. Unions
will fight to sever their crafts from a large group as
when a smaller group is given exclusive recognition its
power is increased from what it was when it was only a
part of the larger unit. The one-man unit with exclu-
sive recognition is in an equal bargaining position
for his rights as the unit with 9,800 members has for
i-js employees. The unit determination is important, so
it should be treated as such.
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CHAPTER VI
RECOGNITION OF EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS
A. Classes of Recognition
1. General . There are four classes of recognition
1 OQ
an employee organization might request: informal, 7
130 131 ] opformal, exclusive,""" and national. Recognition
of such employee organizations continues binder IO988 as
long as the organization satisfies all the criteria for
the type of recognition granted. Any type of recognition
may be withdrawn upon a determination by appropriate
means upon periodic reviews that the recognized criteria
are no longer met. ^ One of the deviations from the
NLRA is that under the Act there are not different classes
134
of recognition established as there are under 10988.
Under the NLRA, labor organizations have only one class
of recognition and are equally recognized or not recog-
nized as such. The diversity under IO988 allows a larger
129. 10988 §§3, ^b.
130. 10988 § 5b.
131. 10988 § 6b.
132. 10988 § 5a; DOD lkZS.1 (l964)§ VI A(2) 5; NCPI
721, 3-1.
, N
133. 10988 § 4; FPM, ch. 711 (3) 3.3.
134. 10988 II 3-5; NLRA § 7.
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number of employees to be represented regardless of
their union affiliation. To qualify for recognition for
any classification under 10988, the organization must
meet those basic requirements discussed in the previous
chapter in defining an employee organization and as pre-
135scribed by regulation. -/ -y
2. Informal Recognition . Informal recognition will
be accorded by an agency to an employee organization to
represent its members when such organization does not
meet the criteria necessary for formal or exclusive recog-
nition. Such recognition will be accorded regardless of
how many other employee organizations will have been
granted informal, formal or exclusive recognition. Ac-
cordingly such informal recognition may properly be granted
to qualified employee organizations which seek to represent
members who are employees. To gain such recognition, the
organization is required to make formal application for
.
.
136
recognition and to show that it represents some at the
135. 10988 § 2; FPM, ch. 711 (3) 3-3; DOD 142.6.1 IV 1
(1964).
136. DOD 1426.1 VI C (1964). Any organization re-
questing informal recognition must furnish in writing a
copy of the organization's constitution, bylaws, and ob-
jectives; a roster of officers and representatives; a
statement that the organization practices no discrimina-
tion based on race, creed, color, or national origin; and
proof of compliance with The Code and Standards (see
note 40 and 4l supra )
.
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installation. There is no set number of employees from
an activity which must belong to the organization before
137tney may be informally recognized. -" Organizations
that are recognized informally may be permitted to pre-
sent their views to appropriate managerial executives, ->
if such views are matters of concern to its members.
3 procedure will not be allowed to interfere with the
Lt conduct of the activity's business, however.
This does not mean that management must consult informally
recognized organizations in its formulation of personnel
matters. In effect, informal recognition is no more than
a long-established practice of receiving and considering
139
employees 1 and unions 1 views. There is nothing, how-
ever, to prohibit management from inviting representatives
of organizations with informal recognition to participate
in joint employee counsel groups and it would appear to be
137. FPM, ch. 711 (k) 1.
138. DOD 1426.1 IV 3 (Aug. 18, 1964) defines -"manage-
ment executive" as a person who :es or responsibly
rec ids man: tit policies, or dire ;e s a
program, activity or major function of the Dep't of De-
fense, including any Lividual who exercises any execu-
tive authority over any administrative entity or portion
thereof whose employees comprise a unit established for^
formal or exclusive recognition purposes, and his immedi-
ate subordinates having significant supervisory responsi-
bilities .
139. FPM, ch. 711 (ll) ^ (^-2).
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a reasonable solution to giving informal groups an
opportunity to air their thoughts, as well as give man-
agement the opportunity to disseminate such information
as they deem appropriate to such groups.
3- For: ' "Whereas informal recogni-
tion has no particular criteria for recognition other
than those general requirements that all employee organi-
zations must meet, those requesting formal and exclusive
recognition have specific criteria. Where formal recog-
nition is requested, the organization must affirmatively
establish that lOrfo of the unit are members of the organi-
zation, and that no other organization has qualified as
140
exclusive representative for the unit, as well as the
l4l
requirements of informal recognition having been met,
before formal recognition will be granted. Once another
organization is granted exclusive recognition, formally
recognized units lose their recognition. This is contrary
to "Che practice with informally recognized units, as dis-
cussed above. Management has the prerogative not to
grant formal recognition to employee organizations who,
because of their particular peculiarities, often drop in
i4o. 10988 I 5.
l4l . See note 135j sur>r<
5h

4 lh-2
membership below 10% of the unit. An example of such
a unit might be a group that extends beyond 10$ due to
seasonal requirements. If the agency is satisfied that
the membership of the organization equals or exceeds 10$,
it may grant formal recognition without requiring any af-
firmative proof. The scope of 10988 is broad and au-
thorizes each agency to establish procedural rules to
carry out its own doctrine. The Federal Personnel
Manual sets forth such procedures for all governmental
Ihk-
agencies. Each agency m turn publishes their own,
such as the Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions (NCPl)
or the Army Civilian Personnel Regulations (CPR) . Where
there is some question concerning the vote, it is allow-
able for an agency or labor organization to have an in-
dependent outside source count the vote or authenticate
145
records to determine membership.
For the purpose of formal recognition, the unit will
not normally have to be as precisely defined, as those
units only formally recognized represent only those per-
sons who belong to their organization, whereas a unit
that is given exclusive recognition represents all the
142. 10988 § 4; FPM, ch. 711 (5) la.
143. 10988 § 10.
Ikk. FPM, ch. 711.
145. 10988 § 11} FPM, ch. 711 (5) 1(2)
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persons in the unit regardless of whether they are mem-
bers of the u.i.ployee organization or not. There will be
occasions when organizations will have a close vote and
the agency or organization requesting formal recognition
will require a definitive determination of the composi-
tion of the unit before the percentages can be deter-
mined. Once an employee organization is granted formal
recognition, the agenc consult with it from time
to time on the formulation and implementation of person-
nel matters which might affect the members of its unit.
The consultation right has significant meaning as,
if it is interpreted literally, it is difficult to sepa-
rate those orders and directives chat do have some refer-
ence to personnel matters from those that do not. It
might appear that the unions would not be allowed to dis-
cuss personnel matters if they were of that category that
are within the prerogative of management. "Prerogative
of management" is a nebulous term, however, and it would
seem better to discuss anything pertaining to personnel.
Even so, there is no requirement that management follow,
but only that they listen. To union leadership, it is
important to be able to present their problem to someone
of prominence on the management team so as to enable them
to report to their membership that their problem has been
aired.
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Not only must the agency consult with the organiza-
tion, but it must manifest an affirmative willingness to
seek a satisfactory understanding. The employee organi-
zation is further entitled to present its views at any
reasonable time pertaining to personnel policies, prac-
tices, working conditions, and other- related matters of
146employment
.
4. Exclusive Recognition . The very heart of IO988
is the granting of exclusive recognition to employee
147organizations. Those units that are granted exclusive
recognition are in a position to collectively bargain
with the installation management concerned for their unit,
as well as negotiate a contract. This means that even
though many personnel in the unit might not belong to the
organization or have acquiesced in its philosophy of
representing them, they will nonetheless be represented
by the organization once it has, in fact, received exclu-
sive recognition. When collective bargaining takes place
on personnel matters or a contract is signed by the em-
ployee organization and the agency, all the members of
the unit are bound even though they might not agree with
anything the employee organization stands for or has
146. 10988 § 4b; FPM, ch. 711 (5) 5-2; DOD 1426.1, XI
B (1).
147. 10988 § 6.
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contracted with the agency for. As a result of this,
the agencies in implementing 10988 provisions have at-
tempted to be particularly careful that the procedures
set forth in pertinent regulations be explicitly
followed before an employee organization will be granted
exclusive recognition.
It is normal practice for those requesting exclusive
recognition to have been recognized formally prior to the
time that they are recognized exclusively, inasmuch as
the requirements for formal recognition must be met be-
fore exclusive recogni may be granted. Employee
organizations will be granted exclusive recognition and
be allowed to represent t'. ployees in the unit when
such organization has met the criteria for formal recog-
nition and has been selected by a majority of the em-
ployees of such unit. The greatest difficulty in deter-
mining whether exclusive recognition will be granted is
determining the unit, as discussed in Chapter V, and the
election procedure discussed subsequently in this chapter
In considering granting exclusive recognition, it
must be remembered that in determining the number of per-
sons in the unit who can be counted toward the IQ'fo neces-
sary for formal recognition, or the 30$ necessary for an
election, to determine exclusive recognition certain per-
sons of the unit cannot be considered. They are:
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managerial executives, any employee engaged in federal
personnel work in other than a purely clerical capacity;
supervisors who affirmatively evaluate the performance of
employees and the employees whom they supervise; and pro-
1 it8fessional employees, unless the majority of profes-
lk-9
sional employees vote to oe included in the unit. The
fact that these persons are prohibited from being counted
toward the total in the unit before recognition does not
mean they cannot be members before or after recognition.
They will not be allowed to hold office, however, unless
150the unit is one of a managerial or supervisory nature.
It would appear that the reason for these restrictions is
to keep management away from .on functions.
148 . A professional employee is an employee whose
duties are to perform advisory, administrative, 01" re-
search work .ch is based on an understanding and appli-
cation of , as opposed to mere application of, the estab-
lished principles of a science or other field of knowledge
which is generally recognized as conferring professional
standing on a person engaging in such work, which requires
knowledge in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired through study at a college or hospital, as
distinguished from a general education; or as established
a position under the Classification Act of 19^9, as
amended, is properly placed in one of the series of that
Act appropriate for such position at a level of GS-5 or
higher. DOD 1426.1, IV, k (196k).
Ik 10988 § 6.
150. DOD 1426.1, VI, H-l (1964).
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5. National Recognition . Formal recognition at
the national level is authorized, by Section 5 of 10988
when, in the opinion of Lgency head, an employee
organization has sufficient total membership within the
agency as a whole, or a sufficient number of local organi-
zations within the agency to justify it. The Department
of Defense has authorized its agencies to so recognize
151unions. -* The agencies have, in turn, adopted such a
152policy. This practice obviously is advantagous to the
unions, as it gives them a chance to deal at the agency
level on policy matters and perhaps influence policy be-
fore it is promulgated to the installations. Without such
recognition, coupled with the prohibition of bargaining
on matters already decided by present and future regula-
153
tions, the union has difficulty progressing beyond the
activity level. As of 1 March 19o5 3 no unipns have been
formally recognized on the national level. The mere
fact that this provision is made, however, is indicative
that the unions will eventually have a great deal more to
say about policy. It is to be emphasized that such
recognition is not, in this writer* s opinion, intended to
151. Id. at VI, A(5)
•
152. See NCPI, 5a, for an example
153. 10988 § 7(l)
•
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take tlie place of or in any way to detract from bar-
gaining on the activity level. this were done, it
would defeat the real meaning and purpose of the program
of creating and maintaining personal employee-management
cooperation and understanding.
Finally, the various types of recognition are in no
way intended to modify or preclude the renewal or continu-
ation of any lawful agreement previously entered into
between an agency and an employee organization. The
Order does not preclude any agency from continuing to con-
sult or deal with any representative of its employees or
other organization prior to the time that the status and
representation rights of such representative or organiza-
tion are determined in conformity with the Order. In the
absence of any effort on the part of an employee organi-
zation to establish relations contemplated by the Order,
the agency and the organization should consult to the ex-
154
tent that the organization would if formally recognized.
B. Voting for Exclusive Recognition
Perhaps the two most controversial issues connected
with granting exclusive recognition are the determination
of the unit and the rules concerning the vote necessary
15k. FPM, ch. 711, 1(1) 4c; NCPI 721 (l) 2c; 10S>i
§ 15.
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to establish, the unit. Considering arguendo that the
unit has been established, the question arises as to
what percentage of the people in the unit must agree to
have the organization represent them before the unit will
be granted exclusive recognition, and what procedure must
be followed to make the determination . Executive Order
10988 states formal recognition will be granted when
"designated or selected by a majority of the employees
15 5of such unit;." -^ The NLRA also prescribes that a ma-
jority vote of the employees in an appropriate unit will
156determine whether the unit will be recognized. It has
been the practice under NLRB that if a majority of the
persons who vote in an election vote for formal recogni-
157tion that will suffice. -is is appealable if the
election is claimed to be non-representative. This would
technically mean under NLRA a unit with 1,000 people, 500
of whom belonged to the union, and only 100 voting, would
require only 51 votes for exclusive recognition. None-
theless, all 1,000 members of the unit would be bound by
the contract made.
155. 10988 I 6.
156. NLRA S 9(a); 29 U.S.C. S 159a (1958).
157. NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., Ill F.2d 978 (7 th Cir
1940); N.Y. Handkerchief Co. v. NLRB, 114 F2d . l44
19^0)
.
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In contrast with b LRA procedure, the Department
of Defense has created, the so-called "60 percent rule."
This rule states that before a union can be formally
recognized at least 60 percent of all the employees
eligible to vote who are members of the unit must vote,
and a majority of those voting must vote for recognition,
or, in the alternative, a majority of all members of the
1"
unit must vote "Yes." This creates a situation where
if 60 percent of all the employees eligible to vote do,
I
in fact, vote, only 51 percent of those voting, or 31$ °f
the total unit, would have to vote for recognition for
the union to win. 59 percent voted, a majority of
all the people in the unit, 51 percent of the total unit
membership, would have to vote for formal recognition.
For example, if there were 200 people eligible to vote
in a unit, and 120 (60 percent) voted, only 6l would have
to vote for recognition; but if 119 voted, a majority of
101 people would have to vote for recognition. A simi-
lar case arose at the U. S. Naval Station, Cecil Field,
158. FPM 711 (6) k; DOD lk26.1, VI B (196k); NCPI
721-3D.
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159Florida. The unions have been most critical of this
procedure inasmuch as they believe the same procedure
160
should be followed as is followed under the NLRA.
Mr. B. A. Gretta, President of the AFL-CIO, Metal Trades
Department, in September of 19o3j stated:
"Labor is vigorously opposed to the require-
ment that in elections it must get a majority
of all those eligible to vote when less than
60^0 of the eligible participate. Some equit-
able solution must be found to the warped ap-
plication of the majority vote rule as is be-
ing applied by the various agencies in elec-
tions conducted under the order. It is mani-
festly unfair. »l6l
On November 11 and 12, 19^3 , at the 51st convention of
the AFL-CIO Metal Trades Department Convention in New
159. Administrative Ruling of the Secretary of Labor
Pursuant to IO988 § 11, ADM. Rule No. 1 (March S, 1963)j_
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists /hereinafter cited as IAM/,
Lodge 163O, Cecil Field, Fla. , was having an election.
They received a plurality of all votes cast, but were
three votes short of a majority. There was another
union running. .nety-three percent of those voting and
80^ of those eligible to vote, voted for union represen-
tation. The Secretary of Labor denied an appeal under
§ 11, IO988, pointing out that formal recognition was
available under the order. Cf. speech of Mr. B. A.
Gretta, Pres. AFL-CI0
5
to Industrial Relations Office,
Dep't of Navy (Sept. 26, 1963), &ERR **, E-5 (1963).
160. A study of the NLRA and NLRB decisions have
disclosed no fixed requirement as to the number of eligi-
bles who must participate in an election in order to have
the majority vote of the participants be determinative.
161. GERR k, E-5 (1963).
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York City, the problem of elections was discussed in some
detail. In connection with the 60 percent rule, it was
commented that IO988 is couched in language very similar
to the NLRA when it prescribes that an organization will
act as the exclusive representative of the employees in
an appropriate unit when such organization "has been
designated or selected by the majority of the employees
m sucn unn. The representatives at the convention
expressed their shock to find that under the order its
departments and councils acquiesced in the so-called
"60 percent rule." DOD 1426.1 (1962) was vigorously
criticized as was NCPI 721. It was considered unduly
restrictive and discriminative, in favor of employers,
16
to apply the 60 percent rule. These comments by the
AFL-CIO leadership indicate that the unions are quite
disturbed about the 60 percent rule, and it is reasonable
to assume that they will attempt to take appropriate ac-
tion to have this problem alleviated by executive edict
or legislation. It would appear that the unions are
having difficulty in getting the 60 percent rule rescinded
162. LMRA § 6.
163. DOD 1426.1 (1962) superseded by 1426.1 (196U),
164. Rep. of Metal Trades Dep tJc, AFL-CIO, on IO988
at 51st Convention, N.Y. City (Nov. 11-12, 1963), GFRR
10, (c 2-3) (1963).
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inasmuch as DOD 1426.1 of 18 August 1964 did not change
it. An attempt was apparently made by the Civil Service
« ^ 165Commission to whittle away at the 60 percent rule.
Inquiry was made as to whether 60 percent of all persons
in the unit must vote or only 60 percent of those per-
sons in the unit present on the day of the vote should
have to vote. The Civil Service Commission emphasizes
the suggestion of the President's Temporary Committee on
Implementing IO988 that generally a "representative vote"
in representative elections would mean a minimum of 60^0
of those employees in the unit who are eligible to vote .
However, it was contended that the 60 percent rule "was
not meant to he applied as a rigid rule," but only as a
guideline. The Commission suggests a "representative
vote should generally mean a minimum of 60^ of those in
the unit who are present at the time of the election and
eligible to vote . " Subsequent to the above interpreta-
tion, no arbitration decision has been handed down where
a union has not had 60 percent of the vote, but has been
close to that figure, and the agency refused to grant
recognition. Once again, however, DOD 1426.1 (1964),
which was subsequent to the above letter, did not include
I65. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n Bull. No. 711-6 (l964)
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the interpretation given the 60 percent rule by the Com-
mission. This, of course, points up the unions' com-
plaint of non-uniformity among the agencies. I am of the
opinion that if the fac"i:s of the Cecil Field Case were
to go to an arbitrator now, it would be decided that
recognition had been gained.
Mr. Macy, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
in a report to the President on the second anniversary of
IO988, sympathized with the unions' problem with the 60
percent rule, but believed the present voting procedure
should continue inasmuch as complaints were made in only
a small number of cases. a believed, however, that the
rule should be scrutinized in the future to determine
whether any adjustment should be made. It is to be
remembered that Mr. Macy was the Vice Chairman of the Task
Force which recommended IO988. After Mr. Macy made his
report to the President, John Griner, President of the
American Federation of Government Employees, agreed with
it in general, but emphatically disagreed with the 60 per-
cent rule and stated that "the requirement that 60 percent
of the employees in a unit must vote -co make a bargaining
election valid should stop. A union which gets a majority
-I /^O
of votes cast should receive exclusive recognition."
166. See note 155, supra, for facts of Cecil Field case
167. GERR 21, (A0iy~Tl96k) .
168. GERR 25, (A-2) (l96h).
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It can be seen why labor organizations dislike the
60 percent rule even though, there are large numbers of
government personnel who are now members of employee
l69organizations which have acquired exclusive recognition.
If a union only had to have a majority of the votes cast,
this would allow a smaller percentage of the employees
to acquire exclusive recognition, resulting in binding
all the members of the unit, regardless of their interest.
There might be some question as to the intent of the
drafters of 10988, as they did not include the 60 percent
170
rule only requiring a majority of the unit, but it is
obvious that the drafters of the administrative instruc-
tions submitted by the agencies, such as Department of
Defense Directive 1426.1 (1964), felt a very strong duty
to protect the individual employees from having to par-
ticipate in union activity or from being controlled by
union contracts with the agency unless an actual majority
of the employees wanted to participate. The drafters, it
might be surmised, intended an interpretation that was
the same as that followed by the NLRA when their back-
ground is considered and when the similarity of language
169. GERR 39, (C-l) (1964). Employee organizations
have gained exclusive recognition as of June 8, 1964, for
244,000 civilian employees of the federal government ex-
cluding the Post Office Dep r t , which represents 490,000.
170. IO988 § 6a.
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of IO988 is compared with NLRA, Section 9(a). Because
of the political influence of labor unions and their im-
portant part in our society today, it appears to the
writer almost certain that the interpretation as to
voting decided under the NLRA will be followed in the
not too distant future. The unions already have some
support for their position, as Labor Secretary "Wirtz is
sympathetic to the union position on the 60 percent rule.
In November of 1963, Secretary Wirtz told the unions to
be patient with 10988 and promised his "complete sup-
port" to have the 60 percent rule changed. He stated,
further, that at the present time all that could be done
was to try to "sell" the various government agencies on
revising their present policies by administrative instruc-
171
"Cions .
The unions argue that under the democratic process
in the United States, the actual number who go to the
polls and vote, though important, should not be control-
ling, as the same situation is prevalent in political
elections and they are not invalidated or refused to be
conducted based on the number of people who vote. Some
union representatives believe that education of the mem-
bers of the unit on their responsibility to vote and
171. GERR 10, (A-6,7) (1963)
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represent their rights is the only solution, and once
the members of the unit are educated to their obligation
to vote and do not, they should have no recourse against
172those who do vote and end up controlling the unit.
It is contended that all NLRB-type elections are not
necessarily accepted as representative. An example is
cited where there were 55 members in a unit and only 2h
votes were cast. It was decided that the 2k- votes were
not a representative vote. ' -^ The above case is used as
an example that the private system makes equitable deci-
sions and consequently the same could be true under
10988.
It would appear "co this writer that perhaps there is
no authority on the part of the agencies to modify Sec-
tion 6(a). Section 6(a) requires no 60 percent rule, but
only the majority by the members of the unit. The NLRB
has uniformly held that a majority means a majority of
those voting. Section 6(a) appears clear and unambiguous
and should not be subject to administrative construction,
as there is no power granted by 10988 to amend it by
174
regulation. This is presupposed on the fact that
172. Comments heard by this writer from various labor
leaders at a seminar on labor relations, Washington, D. C
(Feb. 196^+).
173. Alaskan Glacier Seafood Co., 25 LRRM 13^6 (1950)
174. Kashland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. kkl (1936).
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executive orders have the force of law jto the same ex-
tent as a legislative enactment . ""
'
J Where an act is
plain and unambiguous, the government agency administer-
ing the statute has no power to amend or extend it by
1 try /?
regulation. The agency should be bound by 10988 as
its own regulation.-1-''' it of course could be changed
by an amendment to the executive order. Until that
time, it would seem that even the President would be
bound by his own order.
C. Exclusive Recognition Without Election
There will be many instances where units will ac-
quire exclusive recognition without the requirement of
an election. Executive Order IO988 prescribes granting
exclusive recognition where the organization has been
"designated or selected by a majority of the employees
of such unit as the representative of such employees in
178such unit." This language has been elaborated on and
implemented in detail by Department of Defense Directive, '
'
175. U.S. v. Gilbertson, 111 F2d . 978 (7th Cir. 1940)
176. U.S. v. Powell, 95 F2d. 752 (4th Cir. 1938).
177. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957);
Acardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
178. 10988 § 6a.
179. DOD 1426.1, VI, B (1964).
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and further by the particular agencies in question,
such as the Secretary of the Navy. ou An example of the
latitude with which an agency may direct its activities
to determine majority status in a unit is the Secre-
tary of the Navy's NCPI, which directs, in connection
with exclusive recognition, that an election does not
have to be held to determine whether a majority of unit
desires representation by the unions if satisfactory
evidence exists that a majority of the eligible em-
ployees in an appropriate unit want to belong to the
organization or have indicated in writing that they de-
-i O-l
sire to be represented by the organization. This
determination of majority sta oes not mean that a
majority of the members of the unit must belong to the
employee organization, as under the -provisions of Sec-
tion 5A of IO988, only the requirements for formal recog-
nition have to be met and only ten percent of the em-
ployees of the unit must be members of the organization
to gain such recognition. The remainder of the fifty-
one percent required for the majority of any particular
unit can be acquired by getting members of the unit, who
do not necessarily desire to be members of the employee
organization, to sign "authorization cards," (proxy
180. NCPI, 721 5 3-
181. Id. at 3-2 (c)2.
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cards) stating that they agree to be represented by the
182
organization.
The determination as to whether an election is to
be held or whether the unit will be accepted without an
election Tor the purposes of exclusive recognition re-
mains within the discretion of the agency. In the event
an organization claims a majority representation for the
unit and the agency won't accept the evidence establishing
the alleged majority, the organization may ask for an
election if it can show it has 30/° of the employees of
the unit as members. -* If the agency refuses to allow
the election, the union can request that an arbitrator
be appointed to make an advisory opinion as to its right
to hold an election, as well as -co supervise it if they
are entitled to it.
Recognition is, of course, the beginning of the
management-labor relationship. Care must be exercised
to ensure the employee and employer have their respective
positions protected. Once the recognition problem is re-
solved, the union representing the unit has a good deal
of control over the daily activity and working conditions
of all in the unit. This becomes even more pronounced
when the contract is successfully bargained for.
182. Id. at C(2)a.
183- Id. at 3 C(3)
•
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CHAPTER VII
NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS
A. Scope of Inquiry
The scope of* inquiry here is the content of the
agreement between labor and management and not the
mechanics of negotiation. Suffice it to say that nego-
tiations are carried on by labor and management teams
whose size depends on such things as the complexity of
the unit and scope of the matters to be bargained for.
Often the contracts will be long and the time con-
IStsumed in reachxng agreement on them lengthy. J
The negotiated agreement is one of the primary ad-
vantages the exclusively recognized union is entitled
to and desires. The agreement is no more or less than a
contract and should be treated as such. At the outset
it must be realized that the government has not given
up all its rights and control over labor and has specix'i-
cally reserved some prerogatives that labor in the
civilian sphere can negotiate. The law directs manage-
ment and labor to remain within the -provisions of
18^. U.S. Army Missile Support Command, Redstone Ar-
senal, and AFGE Lodge I858, 37 GERR (contracts) 160
(196^). This contract consists of 28 arts., with 37 sees
I85. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Bremington Metal
Trades Council, 00 GERR (contracts) 2 (1963). This nego-
tiation took eight months.
7'

186 187pertinent governmental and agency regulations when
1 PyPt
c'liing an agreement. tgemeht is further prohibi-
ted from contracting away its managerial rights which in-
clude such things as: the right to direct, hire, pro-
mote, transfer, assign, retain within a job, suspend, de-
mote, discharge, relieve for lack of work, and deter-
mining the method, means and personnel by which the job
is to be done. ^ All contracts must include such re-
190strictive clauses. It is obvious that the government
does not intend to approach negotiation with employee
organizations on the s. ;asis as private employers.
Even with these restrictions, in our large and com-
plex governmental structure there is substantial room
for give and take in matters that do not go to the heart
of governmental authority. Certainly there must be
significant differences in attitude between the roles of
the executive branch in carrying out public policy and
its role as an employer. , alysis of a good number
IS 10988; FPM; Code; Standards.
187. Dep't of Navy Inst, will be cited as examples of
typical agency instructions. Care should be taken in
services other than the naval service to check appropri-
ate regulations
.
188. 10988 § 7(l)
1S9- 10988 § 7(2).
190. Army Eng ' r Dist., Buffalo, N.Y., and Nat ' 1 Mari-
time Union of America, AFL-CIO, art. II § 3, 21 GERR
(contracts) 38 (196k).
15

of the contracts negotiated makes it obvious there are
numerous problems left to negotiate and ample problems
to cause both the government and labor difficulties if
mistakes are made. The importance of intelligent nego-
tiation procedures cannot be overemphasized. Even though
there is a two year maximum limit on the contract
191period, precedents estaolished are hard to overcome
in future negotiations. .e reality that once the con-
tract is signed the terms are to be complied with must
be realized or the consequences can be expensive. For
example, "wash up time" is a negotiable matter. Human
nature being what it is, people will wash where they have
never washed before because they think they are getting
something for nothing. In the Puget Sound Shipyard Con-
192tract, y the following clause will be found: "A reason-
able time for clean up prior to lunch and prior to the
end of the shift will be allowed each employee where du-
ties have been determined by the employer as requiring
personal hygiene for the control of health hazards."
1Q3
ere are 9,686 employees in that unit, ' J and if they
are allowed five minutes before lunch and at the end of
191. DOD 1^26.1 X C 2d (196^).
192. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Bremington
Metal Trades Union, art. 7 B k, GERR 00 (contracts) 2
(1963).
193. GERR 39 (C-8) (1964).
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the shirt, five days a week, at an average salary of
$2.50 per hour, the cost will be $104,884 per annum.
This is not intended as a criticism of the Puget Sound
contract, but it does emphasize what a little time can
cost and what a possible error might encompass.
B. Classification of Contracts and Clauses
Contracts have been classified in three general
categories. First, the so-called "boiler plate" con-
sist of chose mandatory provisions directed by IO9S8,
the agency requirements, and perhaps provision for union-
management meetings. This type of contract is normally
found where the union is being initially recognized and
local union management is satisfied to get anything to
become established. [The Marine Corps Air Facility, New
River, North Carolina, and Naval Auxiliary Air Station,
194 1Chase Field, Texas, contracts are examples. y _J
A second category is the so-called "boiler plate
plus." This is a contract that makes provision not
only for mandatory requirements but may go somewhat
further and include agreements on such things as shop
194. Marine Corps Air Facility, New River, N.C.,
and AFGE; Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Chase Field, Tex.,
and AFGE, on file in Office of Industrial Relations,
Dep' t of Navy
.
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stewards, use of government facilities, promotion pro-
grams, and provision for the function of union officers.
At times many current agency regulations will be inclu-
ded. This might appear peculiar inasmuch as the provi-
sions of the agreement must adhere to existing regula-
tions, "but it is often desirable to re-emphasize an al-
ready regulated issue. The Military Sea Transport
Service has entered into a good number of this category
of contract. y>
The last general category of contract is known as
a "full contract." Such a contract will have numerous
cypes of agreements, being limited only by law or regula-
tion. The subject matter that has been included in con-
tracts to date can be classified as that pertaining to
union affairs, duty status of employees, and employee
relations and leave.
Normally the union is particularly interested in
reaching a clear understanding as to the rights the
union has to carry on union affairs within an installa-
tion. Provision has been made for the appointment and
195. Military Sea Transport, Atl . Area, and Nat '
1
Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, GEPJR 6, (contracts)
62 (1963).
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duties of shop stewards. Such, clauses designate "a
196reasonable nuinber" or set out a definite ratio based
197on the nuinber of employees. y ' A definite number ap-
pears a more reasonable approach to avoid ambiguity.
Most contracts to date have used the ratio approach,
198
with the ratio varying considerably. The importance
of the number of stewards is that they are allowed to
199perform many of their functions during the work day.
The use of government facilities such as bulletin boards,
space in the house news organ, meeting areas, and the
conduct of union business on the government installation
during non-work hours, are items that have been bargained
~ 200
xor. Agreement is often made to allow appointed or
196. Blue Grass Army Depot 1 and Ft. Estill Lodge
859 IAM, AFL-CIO, art. XII-1, GERR k-2 (contracts) 197
(196k).
197- Charleston Naval Shipyard and Charleston Metal
Trades Council, AFL-CIO, art. IV- 2, GERR 36 (contracts)
1^9 (1964).
198. Ibid . (Ratio one steward per quarterman. )
.
Lt'l Naval Medical Center, Lodge 361 AFGE, AFL-CIO,
art. VI-1, k GERR 9 (contracts) 82 (1963) (ratio one
steward per forty employees).
199. U.S. Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va
.
, and
Lodge 97, IAM, art. XXI-1, GERR 23 (contracts) k$ (196*0 •
200. Fed. Aviation Agency, Atlanta Aircraft Mainten-
ance Base, and Lodge 2123, AFGE, art. XXI, GERR 33 (con-
tracts) 45 (1964).
79

elected, -union officers leave of absence on an earned
annual leave basis or a leave without pay basis to act
m such, offices. This applied to union office above
the local level. From an examination of such conces-
sions concerning union affairs, it can be seen that much
time will be lost and money expended in the execution of
union affairs. The question is will the worker be
happier or the quality of work improve.
Employee duty status is a bread and butter item to
the union, as these are the provisions that deal most
directly with the employee from day to day. Usually the
hours of work are set 01; the agreement and provision
made for no change to be made unless the union is con-
, . 202
suited. There is nothing ."event the negotxation
of which hours will be worked so long as the eight hour
day is not infringed upon. Overtime procedures may be
established entailing the criteria to be used in deter-
203
mining who will be the recipient. Some agreements
have required the employee to be notified a set number
201. U.S. Naval Station, Washington, D. C, and
Washington Area Metal Trades Council, art. XIV-1 , GEPJR
45 (contracts) 239 (196*0-
202. Charleston Naval Shipyard and Charleston Metal
Trades Council, AFL-CIO, art. VI, GERR 36 (contracts)
(1964).
203. Id. art. V.
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204
of hours before he lias to perform the overtime, and
205
others go so far as to allow him to refuse it. a
controversial issue often discussed, has been the ques-
tion of coffee breaks and lunch periods. There is no
reason a coffee break or lunch period cannot be agreed
upon, but the controversy is can they be allowed during
the paid eight hour day? In the Redstone Arsenal Con-
H-^^ 206tracx
i it was agreed that a thirty minute "lunch
break" and two fifteen minute "rest periods" during the
paid work day would be allowed. An examination of the
207papers accompanying the New York Naval Shipyard or
or
the Puget Sound Shipyard contracts will show that the
respective unions tried to reach agreement on "coffee
breaks" during paid working hours but were refused. The
basis of the Navy refusal was its regulation establishing
20°
a forty-hour work week y for civilians. They reasoned
two fifteen-minute coffee breaks a day would amount to
their employees working only thirty-seven and one-half
hours a week, but they would be paid for forty hours.
204. Ibid .
205. Ibid.
206. U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal,
Ala., and Lodge 1858, AFGE, art. XII §§ 1, 5, 6, GERR
37 (contracts) (1964).
207
.
New York Naval Shipyard and Brookland Metal
Trades Counsel, AFL-CIO, GERR 12 (contracts) (1963).
208. Contract cited note 180, supra .
209. NCPI, 610.1 (4)d.
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It appears to this writer that the Navy's position is
correct. The Comptroller General said in a case con-
cerning G.P.O. employees: "In fixing compensation for
journeymen, apprentices, laborers, etc., . . . by the
hour for the time actually employed under the procedure
set out in the Act of June 7 9 19^-2, neither the daily
lunch of one-half hour nor any other period of non-
employment during which the employees are regularly and
totally excused from duty may be included in official
210time worked and be counted as time to be paid for."
Even though this decision had direct application to
G.P.O. , it appears the inference is clear and the princi-
ple expressed would be applicable to coffee breaks, rest
periods, or lunch breaks . Nonetheless, it is a negoti-
able matter, depending on one's outlook. This particu-
lar problem has to be distinguished from the "clean up
time" situation, as that is based on "hygiene," and is
211
often allowed.
A third type of clause deals with employee rela-
tions and leave. Of most importance are the questions
of grievance procedures and advisory arbitration. Re-
gardless of any contract provision, each agency is
210. Comp. Gen. Dec, 3-51791 (19^5) 25 CG 315
211. Contract cited note 180, supra .
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authorized to have and does have a grievance procedure.
An example is the Navy's, which allows a man to discuss
his grievances with his supervisor, department head, and
appeal to the installation head. There is provision Tor
a full hearing, with final appeal to the Civil Service
Pi pCommission and/or the Secretary of the Navy. As can
be seen, "che appeal never leaves government channels.
Grievance procedure is a negotiable matter and if such
a provision is negotiated, the employee has a choice of
which procedure he desires to follow, but once the selec-
213
tion is made he cannot change other. Generally,
the negotiated grievance procedure provides for about the
san.e procedure as the agency r -tion except the .
ployee's shop steward will represent or be with him at
each step, and provision will be made for an arbitrator
appointed by the Federal Med^ .1 and Conciliation Serv-
ice, the expense to be borne equally by the agency and
2i4
the employee organization. Prior to any grievance
212. NCPI §§ 750, 770.
213. DOD 1426.1, XI, 4 (196k).
2l4 . U.S. Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla.. and
IAM, AFL-CIO, art. XXVII, GERR 29 (contracts) (196k);
Blue Grass Army Depot, Richmond, Ky. . and IAM, AFL-CIO,
art. XIII, GERR 42 (contracts) (1964); U.S. Coast Guard
Aircraft Repair and Supply Base, Elizabeth City, N.C..
and IAM, AFL-CIO, art. XIX, GERR 35 (contracts) (1964).
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procedure being used it must be determined if a grievance
exists. Some questions are not subject to grievance, such
as reduction in force, letters of caution, race discrimi-
nation, and incentive award decisions as a result of
other appeal provisions. To avoid any confusion on what
is subject to grievance, many contracts have set out in
the contract what will not be subject to grievance pro-
, 215cedures. if this is not done, the final decision as
21 £>to the existence of a grievance rests with the agency.
Other clauses found under this category are clauses
pertaining to discipline of members of the unit. Provi-
sion is made for management to inform the union of all
intended disciplinary : 1 against any member of the
217
unit, member of the union or noo.~ Procedures for
granting annual leave ai-e established giving preference
pi Q
to those with the most seniority, and membership on
certain committees, such as safety committees , is au-
219thorized. y
215. Y. Naval Shipyard, N.Y., N.Y.. and Brooklyn
MTA art. XX k, GERR 12 (contracts) (1963).
216. Code § 3.
217. U.S. Naval Station, Washington, D. C, and.
Washington M.T.C., art. XVIII, GERR k5 (contracts') (lQi
218. U.S. Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va., and
IAM, art. VIII, GERR 23 (contracts) (196^).
219. Id. at art. XII.
8k

In negotiating for any of the above clauses, where
union members are granted, the ;o carry on union
business such as acting as shop stewards, representa-
tion at grievance hearings, committee meetings, etc.,
it should always be kept in mind that it will cost man-
agement money, as most of this type of thing is done
during paid work periods.
""Work Assignment" provisions are a fourth type of
clause. Agreement has been reached for supervisors not
220
to have to do non-supervisory work; consideration by
management of union recommendations as to appropriate
221trade or craft jurisdn' j ob ratings; ~ repre-
222sentation of employees at j< .ng hearings; ' the
appointment of union members to wage survey boards and
223to participation in wage data collection; ^ union repre-
224sentation on incentive award boards; consultation with
the union before a reduction in force and subsequently
allowing preference to those previously reduced when pro-
motions are made; J and notification to the union before
236farming out work. ^
220. Id. at art. XVI.
221. Id. at art. XIV.
222. Ibid.
223. U.S. Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla., and
IAM, art. XI, GERR 29 (contracts) (1964).
224. U.S. Coast Guard Aircraft and Supply Center,
Elizabeth Cit .C, and IAM, art. XII, GERR 35 (con-
tracts) (1964)'.
225. Case cited note 217, supra , art. XV.
226. U.S. Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va
.
, and I.
art. XVII, GERR 23 (contracts) (196k).
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The clauses mentioned, are not intended to be inclu-
sive, but demonstrate somewhat the variety of situations
that have been included in contracts to date. None of
those agreements already approved are considered an in-
227fringement on managerial rights, ~~ ' though such deter-
mination is often difficult to make. It certainly can
be anticipated that many impasses will be encountered as
a result of questions of what is and is not a preroga-
tive of management. An example is "farming out" work.
For years, it was assumed that farming out was a mana-
gerial function and thus not a subject of arbitration
even though many contracts did, in fact, have provision
for farming out. The Supreme Court in 1964 decided this
228
was not a managerial prerogative, but, to the con-
trary, a mandatory subject for collective bargaining
under NLRA § 8(d)
.
C. Weakness of Negotiation
There are certain weaknesses which make the negotia-
tion of a contract most difficult and as a result create
an atmosphere inconsistent with the intent of the Order
22?. 10988 S 7-
228. Fiberboard Paper Products Corp., NLRB No. Ik
(Oct. term 1964)
.
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to establish "better employee-management relations.
These impediments are readily seen when the Standards
of Conduct 22 " are examined. Section 3.2A(l) of the
230Standards prohibits union shop strike, -* work stop-
page, slowdown, and related picketing, the right of
arbitration if an impasse is reached over matters to be
negotiated, and reserves the right of the agency to take
whatever action is necessary in emergencies.
In view of the nature of government operations,
and the fact that the government should not be put in
the position of a civilian employer because of its
sovereignty, X take no issue with many distinctions
between 10988 and LMRA. Certainly the unions' normal
economic weapon of strike could not be tolerated. Strikes
would disrupt the operation of government and put a
non-sovereign entity, labor, in the position of dicta-
ting to government. Some might argue that there would
be little difference between a strike in a civilian plant
making rockets and a strike of employees working for the
government, as both would hurt the overall government
effort. Surely not making rockets would hurt the govern-
ment, but it does not go to the heart of the operation
229. See note kO supra
.
230. Fed. employees are also prohibited from striking
by statute. 5 U.S.C. § ll8(p) (1955) Violation is a
felony. 5 U.S.C. § ll8(r) (1955).
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of the government apparatus as would a strike of actual
government employees, which would paralize all govern-
ment functions, not just production of supplies. The
same position would hold true to work stoppage, slowdown,
and picketing. The failure to allow arbitration or pro-
vide some remedy for an impasse as to what is negoti-
able, and demanding that no agreement be made that is in
conflict with the FPM or other agency regulation is an-
other matter. Both of these restrictions go to the very
heart of any bargaining and for all practical purposes
stop a good percentage of it. If Section 7 of 10988 is
literally construed and management never detaches itself
from their regulations, to h. some become devoted,
there is little use of having IO988. Regulations should
not be considered as holy wri'c;. This is not intended to
propose that regulations should be disobeyed, but they
may be changed, modified, interpreted, and negotiated.
Emphasis on regulatory supremacy can stifle collective
bargaining, and force unions to continue to use the politi-
cal approach to their problems. By political approach is
meant the union leadership complaining to Congress, who,
in turn, applies political pressure on the departments
and agencies. Congress would be more prone to refuse to
interfere if there were some dynamic regulatory procedure
used
.
88

Aside from tlie regulation problem, a more critical
area is the lack of provision for arbitration when a
deadlock is reached over whether a particular matter is
subject to collective bargaining. Section 8, IO9S8, per-
mits the appointment of an arbitrator, with the consent
of the parties , to consider and interpret already negotia-
ted matters, but then only to the extent of making an ad-
visory decision to the agency head. Section 11 provides
for the appointment of an arbitrator, at the request of
one or both of the parties, to make an advisory opinion
to the agency head on unit or election controversies.
Lastly, there is no prohibition against agreeing to the
appointment of an arb or to settle grievances that
cannot be settled. Other than these situations, the
agency is law maker, judge, and jury. Not only is there
no provision for arbitration of deadlocks on what is nego-
tiable, there is no authority to agree to any type of
arbitration with the exception ;ievances. To elimi-
nate any possibility of a misunderstanding on this matter,
at least one agency has by directive prohibited the in-
clusion of arbitration in the contract except in the
231
grievance situation. What the inability to demand
231. Office of Industrial Relations Notice (Navy)
12000 (1963) amending NCPI 720.2-9 (hereinafter cited
as OIR).
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arbitration as to what is negotiable means is that the
agency can refuse to discuss any problem they desire
and there is no appeal therefrom. The Order, by failing
to provide for the handling of such problems to an effec-
tive conclusion, allows the government through its
agencies to at will negate the equality of bargaining
which it allegedly provides.
The argument that the installation must perform
fairly as their agency reviews all contracts before ap-
232proval is a shallow one. There has been little
activity on the agency level other than to approve the
determination of the installatic id, which was the
case in the shipyard cases. The Navy has, on occasion,
however, directed that proposed contract clauses be
amended or deleted to limit union members nominated to
disciplinary, grievance, and performance rating com-
;tees to members of their unit and to the exclusion of
supervisory personnel. They have also directed the pro-
hibition of negotiation of any promotion proviso dealing
with supervisors above the first level; disallowance of
paid lunch periods; and the prohibition of a proviso re-
quiring that advisory arbitration be invoked only with
232. NCPI 4-4(a)3b(2)
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the permission of the offended employee. -^ These di-
rected changes were because of lack of legal basis, and
not because of poor judgment on the agency head's part.
To alleviate these problems, the Order should be
modified to allov; questionable matters to be discussed
regardless of regulation. Most of those matters that
are non-negotiable will not be brought up, anyway. Union
officials are knowledgable and will soon realize what is
and is not negotiable that is not already known. For
the most part, those points that will be bargained for
and that management thinks should not be will be border-
line. In the event a deadlock is reached over what is
negotiable, consideration first should be given to holding
an informal conference at the Washington level between
the agency or department officials and the officials of
the international union involved. If this fails, an im-
partial arbitrator should be agreed upon between the
parties, possibly from the Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service list, or from a centralized board, as dis-
cussed in Chapter VIII, and the decisions therefrom should
be binding on the parties. There should be no advisory
arbitration. Further, a central administrative body
should be created to give unifor throughout the system,
233. OIR Notice 12721 (1963)
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which, would avoid the necessity of various agencies and
ions having to arbitrate the same problems more than
once .
It appears to the writer that the area of bargaining
even as the Order now stands is extensive. There are
many areas that can still be negotiated. It would not
be surprising to see wages bargained for. The minimum
wage is set by law, bu
;
ra is dependent on wage
survey boards. There is no prohibition against such bar-
gaining. The field is wide open and both the agency and
union can be hurt if bhey do not negotiate -chese con-
tracts with care. Both parties must use skilled people
in bargaining. This will be accomplished when it is
realized that labor relations is a problem and skilled
and specially trained personnel are necessary to accomplish
the purpose of the program. The closing of one's eyes to
reality is going to solve no problems, but, to the con-
trary, create them.
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CHAPTER VIII
REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER LABOR PRACTICES
Many rights have been afforded employees by 10988
as extended by the Code of Fair Labor Practices. Manage-
ment is prohibited from refusing to consult, bargain or
234
negotiate when directed by IO9S8, from failing to
recognize appropriate units, and must meet all other re-
235quirements set forth in 10988. The employee organiza -
tion itself is prohibited by the Code from interfering
with employee rights, JKJ or disciplining employees for
the purpose of hindering the performance of duty for the
United States; from striking, or discrimination as to
237membership because of race, creed, or color. •* With
the above rights, which of course are not inclusive, the
picture looks quite rosy. The question here is what can
be done if the agency or the organization refuses to comply
As has been discussed previously, there is an appeal
under Section 11 of the Order on unit determination and
voting controversies in the form of advisory arbitration.
Grievances can be handled by prescribed agency grievance
23^. Code S 3-2.
235. Executive Order IO988 § l(a)
236. Code § 3.2.
237. Ibid .
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o o o
procedure, J and strikes by appropriate established
legal doctrine.^ 9 What of the rest? It is desired that
controversies be settled by negotiation between the
pit oparties. If this cannot be accomplished, the agency
must establish by regulation "a fair and adequate pro-
24lcedure for . . . processing complaints." The investi-
gation and processing of the complaint is made only after
the agency determines there is a "substantial basis for
242
a complaint." The heari:. conducted by an officer
and board appointed by the agency. The agency acts on
243
the board's recommendation and its action is final.
If the employee organization is found to be at fault and
will not take corrective action, the agency may summarily
revoke its recognition, and there is no appeal or provi-
sion to consult any other government agency, including
244the Secretary of Labor.
There can be little question but that the relation-
ship between the union and the agency is one-sided. The
situation parallels a tort judgment with the defendant
238. Code § 3.3(a)l.
235 Code § 3-3.
240. Code § 3.3(a)l.
241. Code § 3.3(a)2.
242. Ibid
.
243. Code § 3.4.
244. Code §. 3.4(a).

having no funds. Although I personally believe that
ninety-nine out of one hund ecisions made "by
government agencies in such matters would be made cor-
rectly and without any partiality because of the agency-
2^
-
installation relationshi it is unrealistic to assume
employee organizations will ever have such an outlook.
To them the agency has all the aces. It is a psychologi-
cal problem in that the unions think they have no chance
of getting a fair decision because the agency has final
determination as to whether an alleged unfair labor
practice will be heard. Further, the right to summarily
take away recognition if union errors are not corrected
is not conducive to free baa -ing between the parties.
This procedure, in the opinion of the writer, is
the most dangerous impediment the success of the Order
faces. As discussed previously, labor practice under
NLRA and IO988 cannot and will not ever be the same, but
it cannot be completely one-sided if it is to work. If
we must have unions in government, we must be realistic
and have the proper relationship.
The best solution to this problem would be to amend
IO988 so as to allow a centralized board of three persons
245. Cf. 52 Geo. L. J. ':-20 at kk6 .
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to hear all disputes as to unfair labor practices. This
would not endanger the defense effort, as the board would
still have to stay within the bounds of the Order. To
further protect the defense establishment in cases from
agencies within the Department of Defense, the board
should consist of a civilian from the Department of De-
fense, a military lawyer, and one other.
Another solution might be to make provision for
arbitrators under Section 11 to hear and make final deci-
sions in such cases subject to veto by the Secretary of
Defense. This is not considered as desirable as it
would not provide as much uniformity and would leave
the final outcome in the hands of one man.
Regardless of the solution, one must be found or
the government labor relations program will be for naught
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIO
Executive Order 10988 has been in practical effect
for about thirty months and its impact is being felt. It
is too early to draw final conclusions, but certain evalu-
ations can be made.
Upon first considering the problem, it might appear
that labor gained nothing from 10988 because of its lack
of teeth in comparison with the NLRA. The lack of abili-
ty to arbitrate to determine negotiable issues, and the
retention in the agency of the right to decide what
issues may be negotiated, make it appear no real rig
to bargain exists. At the most, it would seem that
labor has been adorned with some status symbol but has
been given no real role. One asks why, then, did labor
indorse such a program, which "Chey did with such vigor?
The answer" is labor had no standing with the government,
as a matter of right, before 10988, and anything was
an improvement. Labor has gained the right to talk on
an official basis with management. It was worth not
taking a chance on having the Order not executed to not
have all labor wanted in it. This should not be
246. Task Force Rep.
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interpreted as weakness on labor's part, as it was ex-
pedient at the time. The idea that union leadership was
or ever will be satisfied \, _0988 as it stands would
be unrealistic. Already labor is complaining. ^' The
honeymoon period is over.
Government management has been suddenly confronted
with an entirely new concept of relations with its labor
force. Like anything new, it will take time to work out
acceptable procedures and to properly train personnel to
act in the labor-manager/. ore on this diffextent
level. The realization that labor relations as practiced
with the unions is a quasi legal management-labor problem
must be met. The solution is co act in a haphazard
nature, but one of thought, intelligence and non-emotion.
The problem will not go away and is going to become more
compl
It is predicted that the 60 percent rule will be
abolished. The present sys is one-sided and creates
inequities. A reasonable solution ;o allow recogni-
tion if a majority of those in the unit who vote for
recognition, but to have an appeal available if the elec-
tion is not considered representative. In addition,
247. Rep. of Officers of AFL-CIO Metal Trades Dep't
51st Convention, N.Y., v. 1963), GERR 10 C-l
(1963).
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.nagement should have its gag removed to enable it to
express its opinion to the enrployees . This does not en-
vision criticism of the union management, but only
allowing management's position to be explained.
Arbitration of negotiation impasses on what can be
bargained for will be allowed. This is necessary to en-
sure that such problems will at least be discussed. A
suggested solution to this problem is to create a body
similar to the NLRB . This body should encompass all
government agencies as opposed to each department having
its own
.
The composition of the board should consist of
three persons: one permanent member appointed by the
President, one lawyer from the department concerned, and
one civilian from the department concerned. In those
cases from the Department of Defense, the attorney should
be from the uniformed services. \ addition to the perma-
nent president there should be a permanent clerk and
counsel for the board. The board would sit on the call
of the president. The board would have jurisdiction to:
(l) Issue uniform regulations applicable to all
federal agencies. This would allow uniform implementa-
tion of 10988.
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(2) Make decisions on violations of the provisions
of IO988, and the Standards and Code.
(3) Appoint arbitrators from a panel to be created:
(a) To determine when a subject is or is not
negotiable
;
(b) To determine unit determinations; and
(c) To supervise elections and determine elec-
tion controversies.
There would be no advisory opinions and precedent could
be established. Uniformity, which is lacking at the
present time, should result. The agency and union would
pick their arbitrator from a group submitted. This would
tend to make the decision more palatable, as the arbitra-
tor would be the selection of both union and management.
The present Section 11 arbitrations would be dealt with
in the same manner by this body. These remedies would
assure the union that they were not at the mercy of the
agency as to what can be discussed.
It will be accepted practice to have provisions in
contracts allowing arbitration rendering final decisions
in grievance cases. Unit controversies will not hold
the limelight, as they have been, as the pattern of de-
ions becomes more pronounced. The attitude "coward
rigidity of agency regulation will lessen. An extension
of the contract bar as concerns unit controversies under
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Section 11 from the present twelve months to twenty-
o k olour months""^ or perhaps thirty-six months, as NLR3 now
250requires, * will take place.
From the above discus.- redicted changes there
can be no question but that labor-management relations
in the government will expand, with labor having more th~
fluence. More responsibi will be generated for e#&i**t~
government managers requiri- ire specialized training.
Management now has to deal with the unions, and this fact
must be accepted as a major issue and not swept under the
rug because of a lack of realization or as a necessary
evil. Management must make an exerted effort to bargain
in good faith and labor must bry to cram unreasonable
concepts down management's throat. Both sides have an
opportunity to make history, but it should be done with
foresight and diligence.
In conclusion, it must not be forgotten that it is
desired that every effort be made to allow employee
251
organizations to be heard by management, and that the
spirit of 10988 be complied with. The responsibility of
248. DOD 1426.1 X (1964).
249. The Dep T t of Labor recommends 24 months. ^RR
29 A-l (196*0 •
250. Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp and Paper Mfrs.,
121 NLRB 990 (1958).
251. Fed. Personnel Manual ch. 711? l(l)a /herein-
after cited as FPM/
.
101

OK?
accomplishing this is on each department ana agency ^
of the government, as well as employee organization
cfficials, and requires them to act with integrity and
efficiency of public service and to protect the rights
of individual employees . ^-^
252. Fed. Personnel Manual, ch. 711, l(l)3 /herein-
after cited as FPM/ defines an agency as: "Any federal
department or agency in the executive branch of the
government to which the employee-management cooperation
program applies."
253- FPM, ch. 711, l(l) la(b).
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